United Nations S/2014/709

Security Council

Distr.: General
30 September 2014

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abyei

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 24 of Security Council resolution 2156 (2014), in which the Council requested that I continue to inform it of progress made in the implementation of the mandate of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) and to bring to its attention any serious violation of the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement on Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area (S/2011/384, annex), signed on 20 June 2011. The present report provides an update on the situation in Abyei and UNISFA operations since my previous report of 23 July 2014 (S/2014/518), outlines progress made in the implementation of the additional tasks mandated to UNISFA under Council resolution 2024 (2011) related to the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism, and recommends, for the consideration of the Council, an additional four-month extension of the Force's mandate.

II. Security situation

2. The security situation in the Abyei area was relatively calm during the period under review, despite underlying tensions related to the presence of security elements from both parties and the political deadlock over the territory's final status.

3. Between 120 and 150 armed Sudan oil police personnel remained deployed in the Diffra oil complex in violation of the Agreement of 20 June 2011 and multiple Security Council resolutions. UNISFA also observed the presence of small numbers of armed Sudan People's Liberation Army personnel in southern Abyei, in contravention of the Agreement and Council resolutions.

4. The presence of small and medium-sized firearms among the local communities remains an issue of serious concern. During its patrols, the mission continued to disarm individuals bearing weapons. On 22 July, UNISFA troops disarmed one Misseriya carrying an AK-47 rifle and 25 rounds of ammunition. Two incidents involving gunfire were also reported during the period under review. On the evening of 27 July, UNISFA troops heard gunshots in Awelnuum village, in southern Abyei. After visiting the area and interacting with the local population, UNISFA was not able to identify the source of the gunfire. On the night of 29 July,

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two rounds of gunshots were heard in the vicinity of Abyei town, but the source could likewise not be identified.

5. By mid-July, as the rainy season began north of Abyei, the Misseriya nomads completed their seasonal migration and northward movement out of the Abyei area. As at 10 September, only 5,000 Misseriya were estimated to be present in Dari, Al-Askar, Diffra, Mekines and Farouk, in northern Abyei. The Ngok Dinka population in the Abyei area remained at approximately 81,000. There was no increase in the number of internally displaced Ngok Dinka returning during the period under review.

6. On 28 July, the South Sudan MTN mobile service started functioning in the Abyei area. On 16 September, Sudanese government officials complained to UNISFA about what they deemed to be the establishment of an unauthorized telecommunication service in the Abyei area by a South Sudanese company and, thus, a violation of the sovereignty of the Sudan. The flag of South Sudan, which was hoisted in the aftermath of the Ngok Dinka unilateral community referendum in October 2013, is also still in place on the MTN tower, which is perceived by the Government of the Sudan as an unacceptable provocation. UNISFA is closely monitoring the situation to prevent any security incident around this issue.

7. UNISFA continued to implement its multifaceted conflict prevention and mitigation strategy, which consists of monitoring and early warning assessments, deployment of troops in potential flashpoint areas, robust and deterrent day and night patrols, aerial monitoring, and continuous engagement with local communities through the joint security committees and with the authorities in the Sudan and South Sudan. A total of six joint security committees remained operational during the rainy season throughout the Abyei area. With the arrival of the rainy season, the mission's military component adjusted its deployment plan to enable the provision of security and the protection of civilians in conditions of reduced mobility.

8. UNISFA police personnel continued to provide advice and support to the Head of Mission and Force Commander and the military component on issues related to law and order and protection of civilians. They also provided training and advice to unarmed and voluntary neighbourhood watch mechanisms and community protection committees on matters of law and order and coordination support to community patrols. In addition, police personnel contributed to the efforts of the military component in making the local communities aware of the need for intercommunal dialogue.

9. With the movement restrictions imposed by the rainy season, the mine clearance operations of the United Nations Mine Action Service decreased as a result of the limited capacity available to respond to any emergency explosive ordnance disposal tasks. The Service used this period to focus on operational planning in preparation for the coming dry season and the future task of supporting the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism, as well as capacity-building for staff and implementing partners.

III. Political developments

10. Further to the recommendations from the recently concluded strategic review of UNISFA (see S/2014/336), which were welcomed by the Security Council in its

resolution 2156 (2014), UNISFA, the Secretariat, the African Union Commission and the Government of Ethiopia continued their joint engagement with the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan to encourage them to take concrete steps to promote the consolidation of peace and security in Abyei and resume the implementation of the Agreement of 20 June 2011.

11. Concurrently, UNISFA undertook two initiatives towards the implementation of the recommendations from the review. In July, the mission requested the cooperation of the Government of the Sudan in conducting a joint assessment of security threats to the oil installations in Diffra. The assessment would constitute a preliminary step in developing proposals aimed at addressing the country's concerns in this regard, thereby allowing the withdrawal of their police units. In a meeting with UNISFA on 16 September, the Government of the Sudan objected to the singling out of the oil police and instead proposed a security assessment for the whole of the Abyei area. Discussions continue with the Government of the Sudan on this issue.

12. Early in August, UNISFA began engaging local communities on the need for and advantages of intercommunal dialogue with the Misseriya and Ngok Dinka community groups, including traditional leaders, elders, intellectuals, women's groups, youth, traders, faith-based groups and local authorities. The awareness-raising process was carried out mainly at the battalion level, together with police personnel, and in certain instances within the framework of the joint security committees. Although the overall response was positive, both communities expressed a number of concerns to be addressed either before or during the intercommunal dialogue. Specifically, the Ngok Dinka traditional leadership expressed frustration and called upon the Misseriya to admit responsibility and provide compensation for the assassination of the Ngok Dinka Paramount Chief, Kuol Deng Kuol, on 4 May 2013. Some of their representatives also called upon the Misseriya to recognize the outcome of the Ngok Dinka unilateral community referendum of October 2013, in which the vast majority of that community voted for Abyei to become a part of South Sudan. The Misseriya, on the other hand, expressed concern over the extent to which that referendum could affect their ability to migrate through Abyei and gain access to sufficient water and grazing land for their livestock.

13. On 3 September, the media reported that the President of the Sudan, Omar Hassan al-Bashir, had appointed Hassan Ali Nimir al-Julla, a member of the Misseriya Humr clan, as the new Co-Chairman of the Government of the Sudan to the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee. Mr. Ali Nimir replaced Alkhair Alfaheem Almaki, who had served as Co-Chairman since 25 October 2011. On 15 September, the UNISFA Head of Mission met with Mr. Ali Nimir and his deputy to stress the crucial importance of reconvening the Committee immediately to support the mission in addressing the security challenges facing the area. The Co-Chairman reiterated his Government's commitment to the immediate resumption of the Committee's meetings, as well as to the full implementation of the Agreement of 20 June 2011, including the establishment of joint interim institutions. The Government of South Sudan has yet to confirm the identity of its own Co-Chairman. The previous Co-Chairman, Edward Lino, withdrew from the position following the community referendum of October 2013 and joined the Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Opposition, led by the former Vice-President, Riek Machar.

14. On 1 September, the Chairperson of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, President Thabo Mbeki, raised the need for the meetings of the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee to resume with the President of South Sudan, Salva Kiir, urging him to appoint a new Co-Chair and resume dialogue with the Sudan on the implementation of the Agreement of 20 June 2011. South Sudan has made no progress on these issues. The African Union Peace and Security Council noted with concern in its communiqué of 12 September that key elements of the Agreement of 20 June 2011 had not been implemented and that the delays had affected the return to normal of the life of the people of Abyei. It stressed that, without further progress, the achievements made to date would be jeopardized.

15. On 7 September, the Sudan National Election Commission announced its intention to finalize the delineation of geographical constituencies for the 2015 elections by mid-September and stated that the Abyei area would be included as one of those constituencies. In response, on 11 September the presidential spokesperson of South Sudan stated that neither party could take unilateral decisions with respect to Abyei and that the Ngok Dinka community had already voted predominantly for Abyei to become a part of South Sudan. The parties will need to address this issue, which can pose a serious risk to the stability of Abyei.

IV. Status of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism

16. The aerial monitoring and verification operations of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism continued during the reporting period, following their resumption on 16 June. However, the Sudan and South Sudan have yet to resolve their dispute over the location of the centreline of the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone and its use to demarcate the proposed border crossings. On 20 August, following his meeting with President Mbeki in Khartoum, the Minister of Defence of the Sudan, Abdel Raheem Hussein, called for the full implementation of the security arrangements signed by the two parties and agreed to have a bilateral meeting with his counterpart in the Government of South Sudan to discuss this outstanding issue.

17. In its communiqué of 12 September, the African Union Peace and Security Council noted with concern that, with regard to the cooperation agreements of September 2012, not all elements of the border security agreements had been fully implemented, including the determination of the centreline of the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone. It noted its support for the convening, as soon as possible, of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism to address all outstanding border security issues.

18. As at 10 September, UNISFA, the Sudan and South Sudan had 29, 32 and 34 monitors, respectively, in the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism. On 10 August, the first group of Sudanese monitors was deployed to the sector headquarters in Gok Machar (Northern Bahr el Ghazal State, South Sudan), joining additional UNISFA and South Sudan monitors from Kadugli (Southern Kordofan State, Sudan). Of the 117 force protection troops deployed to the Mechanism, 83 remain in Kadugli and 38 in Gok Machar.

19. Three operations were conducted during the reporting period from the Mechanism's sector headquarters in Kadugli to the areas of Torakit, Wadega and

Kafia Kingi. Three operations were also conducted from Gok Machar to the area of Bebnis, the area east of the 14-mile area, and the area of Kafia Kingi. No military presence from either side was observed within the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone during the missions. On 16 September, the Government of the Sudan requested that ground patrols start in the 14-mile area as soon as possible.

20. The Mechanism remains at the initial operating capability stage, with its headquarters in Abyei and sector headquarters in Kadugli and Gok Machar operational. In Gok Machar, the mission initiated a camp expansion project, which is expected to be completed by March 2015. The delivery of additional accommodation units for the deployment of the full force protection company is expected to begin in December 2014, once road conditions improve. Contingent-owned equipment for the force protection companies has yet to be deployed in sufficient quantities. Preparations also continued for the deployment of the Mechanism to the sector headquarters in Buram and Malakal. These sector headquarters are expected to be completed by April/May 2015 (security conditions in Malakal permitting), at which time the Mechanism will reach full operational capability.

21. The United Nations Mine Action Service collaborated with the Mechanism in training the latter's personnel, including Sudan and South Sudan monitors, on patrol skills, roadblocks, ambushes, hostile crowds, hostage-taking, casualty evacuation, loss of communication, breakdown of vehicles, landmine accidents and traffic accidents. The Service maintained its patrol support teams as an emergency explosive ordnance disposal capacity in Kadugli.

V. Humanitarian situation

22. During the reporting period, humanitarian agencies continued to provide assistance in the following sectors: food security and livelihoods; health and nutrition; education; protection, including child protection; non-food items/shelter; and water, sanitation and hygiene. Assistance included the provision of food rations, packages of non-food items, nutritional screening and treatment of children and pregnant and lactating women, access to education, including access to water, sanitation and hygiene in schools, capacity development, protection monitoring, advocacy, family tracing and reunification, safe drinking water, sanitation and hygiene promotion services. With the facilitation of UNISFA, the World Food Programme office in the Sudan carried out a rapid nutrition and food security assessment of the Misseriya population in the northern areas in Abyei. The assessment was the first to take place since 2011, given the access constraints.

23. Access remains one of the key challenges to the efficient implementation of humanitarian assistance. Besides the prolonged administrative procedures for obtaining travel permits from the Government of the Sudan to reach the Abyei area, the rainy season posed additional logistical constraints, greatly reducing the accessibility of seasonal roads, including the main road between Abyei town and Agok, where most of the non-governmental organizations are based.

24. Contingency planning is under way to ensure that inter-agency coordination arrangements, standby agreements and sufficient stocks are in place in case of new emergencies. Humanitarian planning for 2015 is also ongoing.

VI. Personnel deployment and mission support

25. As at 10 September, the UNISFA military component stood at 4,045, out of the authorized strength of 5,326 troops (annex I). Owing to the late arrival of the rains, the UNISFA rainy season deployment came into effect in mid-July. The mission's troops were redeployed in 10 operating bases, as opposed to 15 bases during the dry season (annex II). The troops conducted an average of 70 patrols per day, including 20 at night, in order to dominate the area of responsibility and address intercommunal conflict associated with the seasonal northward movement of Misseriya nomads.

26. The strength of the UNISFA police component remained at 22 out of an authorized strength of 50 police officers. In view of the failure to establish the Abyei Police Service, which UNISFA is mandated to advise and train, the remaining authorized officers were not deployed.

27. The mission's engineering work continued, but at a slower pace, owing to the rains. The upgrading of access roads between UNISFA camps and the airstrip project in Athony have been postponed until weather conditions improve. Two additional water boreholes were completed at the Banton and Highway operating bases. The mission began preparations for dry season projects, including the planned repair of approximately 130 km of supply routes and access roads to deployment locations. The procurement process was initiated for outsourcing camp services contracts, as were requests for technical clearance for the construction of hard-structure ablution units for all military camps and permanent culvert bridges in the Baloom and Goli areas.

VII. Follow-up mission to the strategic review of the Force's mandate

28. Representatives of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the Secretariat, and of the United Nations Development Programme, on behalf of the United Nations Development Group, visited Abyei, Juba and Khartoum from 10 to 20 September to meet with UNISFA, non-governmental organizations and United Nations country team personnel. The visit, which was a follow-up to the recently concluded strategic review of UNISFA (see S/2014/336), was undertaken to develop proposals for operational support to the recommendations from the strategic review, in particular as they pertain to the stabilization of Abyei.

29. The team's recommendations include modalities for UNISFA support to intercommunity dialogue; United Nations country team and UNISFA support to community protection committees (community-based neighbourhood watch mechanisms) that aim to address communities' law and order needs in the absence of the Abyei Police Service; UNISFA support to the implementation of Abyei Joint Oversight Committee decisions pertaining to the establishment of a weapons-free zone throughout the Abyei area; and the adoption of measures to enhance coordination between UNISFA and United Nations agencies, funds and programmes. The final conclusions of the follow-up mission will be presented to the Council in my next report.

VIII. Financial aspects

30. The General Assembly, by its resolution 68/258 B, appropriated the amount of $318.9 million for the maintenance of the Force for the period from 1 July 2014 to 30 June 2015. Should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of UNISFA beyond 15 October 2014, the cost of maintaining the Force would be limited to the amount approved by the Assembly for the 2014/15 financial period. As at 18 September 2014, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for UNISFA amounted to $95.6 million. Total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to $3,849.2 million. Contributing Governments have been reimbursed for troop and contingent-owned equipment costs for the period up to 31 May 2014 and 31 March 2014, respectively, in accordance with the quarterly payment schedule.

IX. Observations and recommendations

31. I remain deeply concerned about the security situation in the Abyei area. While the area is seemingly calm, incidents at the community level can easily escalate into open conflict, with a commensurate risk of deterioration of bilateral relations between the Sudan and South Sudan. Moreover, the people of the Abyei communities remain bereft of basic social services and vulnerable to ethnic violence. The status quo cannot continue.

32. Moreover, UNISFA cannot implement its mandate to support the maintenance of peace and security and protect civilians in the complete absence of governance and law and order institutions. I am particularly concerned that the organization of elections in Abyei by the Government of the Sudan, in the absence of a joint administration, may lead to political tensions and security incidents. I therefore call upon the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan to immediately resume political dialogue on the management of Abyei. They must, as a first step, reconvene the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee to provide political and administrative oversight to the area, contribute to making the territory weapons-free, facilitate humanitarian access and early recovery for both communities, and support initiatives fostering their peaceful coexistence and reconciliation, as decided by the Committee at previous meetings. The organization of elections by the Government of the Sudan in the Abyei area can be addressed by the Committee.

33. The presence of Sudanese armed police at the Diffra oil field constitutes a violation of the Agreement of 20 June 2011 and Security Council resolutions. I urge the Government of the Sudan to work with UNISFA in conducting a joint assessment of the security requirements for the Diffra oil complex and developing proposals which would allow for the withdrawal of Sudanese police units while ensuring the security of those installations, in accordance with the Agreement of 20 June 2011. At the same time, the recurrent entry of armed Sudan People's Liberation Army elements into Abyei is another violation of the Agreement of 20 June 2011. I call upon the Government of South Sudan to ensure that its security forces do not enter the area.

34. In order to reverse the deterioration in intercommunal relations in Abyei, it is imperative that the Misseriya and Ngok Dinka traditional leaders find closure to the issue of the assassination of the Ngok Dinka Paramount Chief on 4 May 2013.

Mechanisms to address any future dispute between them, in particular those stemming from cattle rustling and other forms of intercommunal crime, should also be developed. I welcome the readiness of the communities to engage in dialogue on these issues and appeal to the leaders of both countries to ensure that a formal intercommunal conference begins as soon as possible and without any preconditions. Meaningful intercommunal dialogue in Abyei will require the support of the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan.

35. In its resolution 2156 (2014), the Security Council welcomed the recommendations from the strategic review and extended the Force's mandate until 15 October 2014. The recommendations from the strategic review included a number of initiatives to address the political and security needs of the disputed area, in particular through the resumption of Abyei Joint Oversight Committee meetings, intercommunal dialogue and administration by the communities under the Committee's supervision.

36. On this basis, the African Union Commission, the Government of Ethiopia, UNISFA and the Secretariat jointly engaged Sudanese and South Sudanese officials to seek an agreement on these initiatives. The objective of this engagement was not to reopen negotiations on the Abyei area. Its aim was to push for the adoption of concrete steps within the agreed framework and provisions of the Agreement of 20 June 2011 on Abyei, deemed necessary to consolidate improvements in the security situation since the deployment of UNISFA in July 2011 and reverse the current trend towards deterioration. Joint engagement on these issues will continue but needs to be sustained on the ground.

37. At the same time, there is a need to step up the facilitation of intercommunal dialogue and increase support for humanitarian assistance and the implementation of early recovery programmes. I have therefore decided to reconfigure the leadership of UNISFA and appoint a civilian as Head of Mission, separating the functions of Head of Mission and Force Commander. The Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan and the African Union Commission have been informed of this decision, which the Government of Ethiopia supports.

38. In order to provide more time for consultations with both parties, I recommend that the Security Council consider a further four-month technical rollover of the Force's mandate. During this period, the Secretariat and its partners will further engage the parties in the resumption of their cooperation on the management of Abyei, with the support of the mission. I intend to provide the Council with consolidated recommendations on future support to the Abyei area, in accordance with the Force's mandate.

39. I welcome the efforts of the parties to fully operationalize the Mechanism and the continued aerial monitoring and verification operations. In order to ensure the full establishment of the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone and the complete and effective implementation of their security agreements, however, the Sudan and South Sudan still need to renew their efforts to resolve the outstanding dispute over the Zone centreline and its use to demarcate the proposed border crossing corridors. I welcome the recent efforts of President Mbeki and the African Union High-level Implementation Panel to facilitate dialogue between the parties in this context. I also welcome the support of the African Union Peace and Security Council and urge the parties to rapidly convene a meeting of the Joint Political Security Mechanism and address all outstanding border security issues.

40. I wish to express my appreciation to the Officer-in-Charge and acting Head of Mission and Force Commander, Major General Halefom Moges, and all the men and women of UNISFA for their sustained efforts to promote peace and stability in the Abyei area in what are often arduous and challenging conditions. I also commend my Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan, Haile Menkerios, President Mbeki and the Government of Ethiopia for their efforts to assist the Sudan and South Sudan in resolving the dispute over the final status of Abyei.

Annex I

Composition of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei military component (including the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism) as at 17 September

Country	*Description*	*Personnel*	*Total*
Benin	Experts on mission	1	2
	Contingent troop	1	
Brazil	Experts on mission	2	4
	Contingent troop	2	
Burkina Faso	Experts on mission	1	1
Burundi	Experts on mission	1	1
Cambodia	Experts on mission	3	3
Ecuador	Experts on mission	1	2
	Contingent troop	1	
El Salvador	Experts on mission	1	1
Ethiopia	Experts on mission	78	4 004
	Contingent troop	3 926	
Ghana	Experts on mission	3	5
	Contingent troop	2	
Guatemala	Experts on mission	2	3
	Contingent troop	1	
Guinea	Experts on mission	1	1
India	Contingent troop	2	2
Indonesia	Experts on mission	2	4
	Contingent troop	2	
Kyrgyzstan	Experts on mission	1	1
Malawi	Experts on mission	1	1
Mali	Contingent troop	1	1
Mongolia	Experts on mission	2	2
Mozambique	Experts on mission	1	1
Namibia	Experts on mission	3	4
	Contingent troop	1	
Nigeria	Experts on mission	3	6
	Contingent troop	3	
Paraguay	Experts on mission	1	3
	Contingent troop	2	
Peru	Experts on mission	1	3
	Contingent troop	2	
Russian Federation	Experts on mission	1	1

Country	*Description*	*Personnel*	*Total*
Rwanda	Experts on mission	1	2
	Contingent troop	1	
Sierra Leone	Experts on mission	2	2
Sri Lanka	Experts on mission	5	6
	Contingent troop	1	
Ukraine	Experts on mission	4	6
	Contingent troop	2	
United Republic of Tanzania	Experts on mission	1	1
Yemen	Experts on mission	3	5
	Contingent troop	2	
Zambia	Experts on mission	2	3
	Contingent troop	1	
Zimbabwe	Experts on mission	2	3
	Contingent troop	1	
Total		**4 085**	**4 085**

Annex II


UNISFA
September 2014
SUDAN
SOUTH SUDAN
Abyei
Sector CENTER
Sector NORTH
Sector SOUTH
Kadugli
Gok-machar
Battalion sector line
Undetermined international boundary
State boundary
Area of Operation
Map No. 4467 Rev. 22 UNITED NATIONS
September 2014 (Colour)
Department of Field Support
Cartographic Section

United Nations S/2014/710

Security Council

Distr.: General
30 September 2014

Original: English

Letter dated 30 September 2014 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to inform you that Mr. Jang-keun Lee (Republic of Korea), whom I appointed on 4 April 2014 to serve as weapons of mass destruction arms control and non-proliferation policy expert on the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009), withdrew from the Panel on 16 August 2014.

Accordingly, in consultation with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), I have appointed Mr. Youngwan Kim (Republic of Korea) to serve as weapons of mass destruction arms control and non-proliferation policy expert.

I should be grateful if you would bring this information to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) BAN Ki-moon

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Security Council

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30 September 2014

Original: English

Letter dated 30 September 2014 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

Pursuant to paragraph 26 of Security Council resolution 2164 (2014), I have the honour to transmit a note verbale dated 22 September 2014 from the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations conveying the report on support provided by French forces to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali from 25 May 2014 to 17 September 2014 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) BAN Ki-moon

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Annex

[Original: French]

Pursuant to paragraph 18 of Security Council resolution 2100 (2013), please find attached the report of France on actions taken since 25 May 2014 by French forces in support of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).

The Permanent Mission would be grateful if the Secretary-General would bring the report to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

Enclosure

Report on support provided by French forces to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali from 25 May to 17 September 2014

Pursuant to paragraph 26 of Security Council resolution 2164 (2014), please find below the report of France on actions taken from 25 May to 17 September 2014 by French forces in support of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).

Since 25 May 2014, French forces have conducted four missions to evacuate injured MINUSMA peacekeepers, in accordance with their mandate under Security Council resolutions 2100 (2013) and 2164 (2014):

- On 11 June, four Chadian peacekeepers and a non-commissioned officer were taken to Gao by medical evacuation helicopter following the explosion of a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device in Aguelhok
- On 22 July, following an accident, a Cambodian peacekeeper in Kidal was taken to Gao by medical evacuation helicopter
- On 29 August, after a MINUSMA vehicle hit a mine 7 km from Aguelhok, two Chadian peacekeepers were taken to Gao by medical evacuation helicopter
- On 2 September, after a MINUSMA vehicle hit a mine 30 km from Kidal, 8 of 14 injured Chadian peacekeepers were evacuated by CASA hospital aircraft to the Chinese level II hospital at the MINUSMA base in Gao

United Nations A/69/412–S/2014/712

General Assembly
Security Council

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1 October 2014
English
Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Sixty-ninth session
Agenda item 35
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Identical letters dated 22 September 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I wish to inform you that at 1520 hours on 5 September 2014, in the locality of Kaff al-Ahmar — Adlun, a Lebanese Army patrol found an Israeli listening device camouflaged as a rock. Before the device could be examined, the Israeli enemy detonated it, killing the civilian Hasan Haydar who was standing nearby.

I should like to reiterate that my Government honours its commitments under international resolutions. I call upon the Security Council to condemn this attack in the strongest possible terms and compel Israel to bring an end to its violations of Lebanese sovereignty by air, sea and land, and fulfil all of its obligations under Security Council resolution 1701 (2006).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 35, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nawaf Salam
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

14-61938 (E) 031014 031014

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United Nations S/2014/713

Security Council

Distr.: General
4 September 2014

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the alternate representatives of the Russian Federation on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received letters dated 4 September 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations stating that Mr. Maxim Musikhin, Mr. Alexandr Repkin and Mr. Dmitry Nekrasov have been appointed alternate representatives of the Russian Federation on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, those letters constitute adequate provisional credentials.

14-61925 (E) 021014

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United Nations S/2014/714

Security Council

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29 September 2014

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the alternate representative of the United States of America on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 29 September 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations stating that Mr. David Pressman has been appointed alternate representative of the United States on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, that letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

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United Nations A/69/421–S/2014/715

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
3 October 2014
English
Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Sixty-ninth session
Agenda item 64 (a)
Promotion and protection of the rights of children:
promotion and protection of the rights of children

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Identical letters dated 2 October 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I wish to transmit the position of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic concerning a heinous terrorist attack crime targeting innocent children who were leaving a school complex in the Ikrimah quarter of Homs city.

The armed terrorist groups have committed yet another crime against innocent children. The victims were leaving a school complex in the Ikrimah quarter of Homs city. The attack killed 33 civilians, 22 of them children, and injured 102, most of whom were also children. The school also sustained significant damage. The incident took place on 1 October 2014. A terrorist planted an explosive device in front of the new Ikrimah school. Minutes later, he detonated himself using an explosive belt in front of the Ikrimah al-Makhzumi primary school in an attempt to kill the greatest possible number of pupils and their families.

The available information indicates that the two terrorist bombings were planned and executed by the terrorist groups which the Western States and their regional proxies enthusiastically refer to as the "moderate armed opposition".

The killing of innocent children and other civilians can have no justification. Yet the international community, as represented by the United Nations, has not condemned the crimes of the armed terrorist groups. Nor has it spoken out against the recent terrorist attacks on schools. The latest incident was but one example; others include the targeting of the Badruldin al-Husayni Faculty of Legal Sciences, the Darulsalam School and the Manar School. Failure to condemn those acts has merely emboldened the terrorist groups to carry out further atrocities.

Certain States distinguish between a moderate and an immoderate armed opposition. That distinction reflects a fundamentally illogical and wrong-headed approach to the terrorist proliferation facing today's world. For three years, Syria

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has warned that certain States have adopted double standards in their response to terrorism. They have armed, funded, harboured and trained terrorist groups under various pretexts, such as support for the moderate armed opposition. That practice must stop; it amounts to a standing invitation for terrorist groups to wreak destruction and murder, slaughtering schoolchildren and other innocent civilians. All of the aforementioned crimes against Syria's children and people were carried out by what is known as the moderate armed opposition, for which Saudi Arabia has said that it will open training camps. Those crimes range from massacring civilians to eating their hearts and livers. They have taken place in full view of global public opinion.

The murder of schoolchildren in Homs encapsulates the ideology and modus operandi of the terrorist groups, who have directed their hatred and lawlessness at Syria's children, and not for the first time. On another occasion, terrorist groups struck against children under the age of three, when fictitious health-care agencies belonging to the armed terrorist groups conspired with the Turkish authorities to cause a humanitarian disaster that claimed the lives of 15 innocent Syrian children, who had been given expired and poisoned vaccinations for measles. Dozens of other innocent children suffered asphyxiation.

These acts of terrorism are part of a series of recent bombings and terrorist crimes in Syrian cities. Funded, armed, trained and harboured by certain States in the region and beyond, the groups have struck repeatedly. They shelled residential areas 1,887 times in August and September alone, killing 296 civilians and injuring 1,487 others, including women and children.

The Security Council has adopted several pertinent resolutions under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) prohibits terrorism and its financing, freezes the assets of terrorist groups and individuals, declares the perpetrators and providers of funding to be criminals, and obliges States to refrain from providing any form of support or safe haven. Security Council resolution 2170 (2014) tackles Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, the Nusrah Front and other individuals, groups, institutions and entities associated with Al-Qaida, and addresses the threat posed by their destructive ideology. Security Council resolution 2178 (2014) provides for the interception and prosecution of foreign terrorist fighters. The position of those resolutions regarding such terrorist acts is clear: specific measures are invoked against the perpetrators and those who support and fund them.

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic once again calls on the Security Council to take a clear stance on this and other crimes committed by armed terrorist groups and, in accordance with its counter-terrorism resolutions, to condemn the Homs attacks in the strongest possible terms.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly under agenda item 64 (a), and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations A/ES-10/659–S/2014/716

General Assembly
Security Council

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General Assembly
Tenth emergency special session
Agenda item 5
Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Identical letters dated 2 October 2014 from the Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council

I regret to inform you of the continuing turmoil and deterioration of the situation in the Occupied State of Palestine, including East Jerusalem, due to illegal and provocative policies that continue to be pursued by Israel, the occupying Power. These illegal policies continue to negatively impact and prejudice the situation on the ground, to cause suffering and hardship for the Palestinian people and to inflame already heightened tensions between the two sides.

The international community bears witness, yet again, to Israel's fixation with its illegal settlement enterprise, which includes the destruction, theft and confiscation of Palestinian lands and properties, the construction and expansion of both settlements and the Wall and the forced displacement of Palestinian families. Just today Israel announced that the construction of 2,610 new units for the illegal settlement of "Gi'vat Hamatos" in Beit Safafa in Occupied East Jerusalem, which was approved in 2012, will now begin and that the Government will publish tenders for construction. If implemented, these plans would further isolate East Jerusalem from Bethlehem, while facilitating Israel's attempts to link its illegal settlements of "Gilo" and "Har Homa". Moreover, in recent weeks, the Israeli Government announced plans to forcibly transfer approximately 13,000 Palestinian civilians from the Bedouin communities, the large majority constituting Palestine refugees, from their current areas of residence to the east of Jerusalem to an area near Jericho. The plan to undertake such a forced transfer, in grave breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention, is also clearly and directly related to Israel's illegal settlement schemes, particularly in the so-called E1 area.

We have repeatedly cautioned that this illegal Israeli settlement campaign is undermining and fragmenting the contiguity and territorial integrity of the State of Palestine and threatens the viability and prospects for the physical realization of the two-State solution on the basis of the pre-1967 borders. This is being carried out in

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flagrant and grave breach of international humanitarian law and in complete defiance of condemnation by the international community. It also should be noted that in the past six months alone, at least 7,500 illegal Israeli settlers have been transferred into settlements in the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem. The Palestinian leadership reiterates its demand that the occupying Power rescind these latest decisions and demands that Israel, the occupying Power, cease immediately and completely all of its settlement activities in the Occupied State of Palestine, including in and around East Jerusalem, and abide by its obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention.

I wish to also bring your attention to another dangerous development regarding the repeated incursions and provocations by extremist settlers at Al-Haram Al-Sharif in Occupied East Jerusalem. Yesterday, 1 October, a group of over 80 Israeli extremists entered the Al-Aqsa compound and assaulted Palestinian worshippers and attempted to attack Al-Aqsa guards all while the heavily-armed occupying forces who were escorting them looked on and refused to take any measures to halt the extremists' attacks. Such provocations not only threaten to ignite the already inflamed climate, but completely disregard the sensitive status of Al-Aqsa Mosque, the first *qibla* and third holiest site in Islam. Such continued illegal Israeli actions at Al-Haram Al-Sharif are also in violation of the numerous relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions calling for the cessation of all Israeli policies and measures aimed at altering the character, legal status and demography of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and for respect by Israel, the occupying Power, of its obligations under international law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits such actions.

Furthermore, we must continue to draw the international community's attention to the ongoing plight of the more than 1.8 million Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip who continue to suffer exponentially from the massive human devastation and physical destruction caused by the more than 50-day criminal Israeli military aggression against Gaza. They must not be forgotten and all efforts must be undertaken to alleviate their suffering and hardships. The humanitarian disaster in Gaza is only worsening as the Israeli blockade continues to obstruct the massive reconstruction and recovery efforts so urgently required. Thousands of families rendered homeless by the Israeli destruction of their homes remain displaced in Gaza, sheltering in UNRWA schools or with host families; thousands of civilians continue to require medical care due to wounds sustained in the Israeli attacks; clean water for human consumption remains scarce; electricity cuts continue up to 18 hours a day because of lack of fuel for the power plant, affecting every sector of life; and thousands of unexploded ordnance launched by Israel at Gaza continue to threaten civilian lives and require removal prior to any effective reconstruction. In addition, yesterday, 1 October, Israeli military vehicles entered the southern Gaza Strip and opened fire on Palestinian farmers tending their agricultural fields, violating yet again the ceasefire agreed to by the parties on 26 August 2014. Also in Gaza, Rahaf Abu Jame, age 5, succumbed to her wounds sustained from an Israeli air strike that occurred during Israel's 50-day aggression. Rahaf's parents were also killed in that same air strike, along with at least 24 other members of the Abu Jame family. Rahaf is the third Palestinian in Gaza to have succumbed to injuries during the past week.

In addition to the above, I am compelled to draw the international community's attention to the several incidents that have taken place since our last letter, dated 17 September 2014. These actions, in violation of international law,

continue to inflict hardship on our people and are aggravating already-high tensions and instability at this time:

17 September

- Israeli naval forces opened fire off the coast of northern Gaza, injuring a Palestinian fisherman, Yousef Zayed, age 70, on a beach while waiting for his sons near al-Sudaniya.

18 September

- Several Israeli bulldozers entered the southern Gaza Strip and levelled Palestinian land. In the week prior, four Israeli bulldozers entered the Al Qarara area and demolished private land.
- Two Palestinians, Ayman Ziad Abu Jibba, age 23, and Abdullah Jibril Abu Aser, age 23, were killed and three were injured when an unexploded Israeli bomb blew up in the Al Shujaiya neighbourhood of eastern Gaza City.

22 September

- Israeli occupying forces assassinated two Palestinians, Marwan Kawasme and Amar Abu Aysha, both in their thirties, in the town of Al Khalil (Hebron), alleging that the two men were involved in the killing of the three Israeli settlers in June.
- Israeli occupying forces arrested four Palestinian fishermen from central Gaza Strip while they were on their fishing boat and arrested eight Palestinians, including two minors, from the West Bank.
- In demonstrations in Al Khalil, occupying forces shot and injured three Palestinians and caused suffering to many others as a result of the shooting of tear gas canisters.
- Israeli occupying forces heavily deployed at all gates of the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound imposing restrictions on the entry of Muslim worshipers, violating the right to freedom of religion, ahead of the Jewish New Year.

24 September

- Israeli forces arrested Palestinians from Bethlehem, Tubas and Hebron districts, bringing the number of Palestinians imprisoned by Israeli occupying forces in the month of September to 560, including 163 prisoners from Al Khalil and 108 from Jenin. Currently, more than 6,000 Palestinians are being held in the occupying Power's prisons, enduring torture, abuse and horrific conditions of captivity.

30 September

- Israeli settlers, escorted by heavily armed Israeli forces, occupied 23 houses in the Palestinian neighbourhood of Silwan, south of the Old City of Jerusalem. The Israeli settlers stormed Silwan and forcibly evicted at least eight families. The families of Baydoun, Al Karaki, Abu Sbeih, Al Zawahra, Al Abbasi, Al Khayyat, Qarain and Al Yamani are now homeless.

In the light of the above and of what has been taking place over the past 47 years of Israel's belligerent military occupation of the Palestinian people and their land, it is high time for the international community, whose commitment to this

solution has been repeatedly reaffirmed, to act consistently with its longstanding principled commitment, and in accordance with relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, to act now to bring an end to this illegal occupation. A clear demand must be made to Israel, the occupying Power, to cease all of its illegal actions and to commit to the path of peace. The international community, foremost the Security Council, has clear responsibilities in this regard and must no longer tolerate the occupying Power's empty pretexts, deception and utter disdain for international law and will. Collective action is necessary to hold Israel accountable for its violations and crimes and finally bring about the complete termination of this Israeli occupation. In this regard, we respectfully implore all members of the Security Council to fully support the Palestinian initiative to seek a Security Council resolution that would, inter alia, delineate a timeframe for an end to the Israeli occupation that began in 1967 on the basis of the longstanding parameters enshrined in United Nations resolutions, the Madrid principles, the Arab Peace Initiative and the Quartet road map, in order to finally achieve the freedom and rights unjustly denied to the Palestinian people and allow for the realization of peace and security for both sides.

The present letter is in follow-up to our 522 letters regarding the ongoing crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, which constitutes the State of Palestine. These letters, dated from 29 September 2000 (A/55/432-S/2000/921) to 17 September 2014 (A/ES-10/657-S/2014/672), constitute a basic record of the crimes being committed against the Palestinian people. Israel, the occupying Power, must be held accountable and the perpetrators must be brought to justice.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Riyad **Mansour**
Ambassador
Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine to the United Nations

United Nations A/69/427–S/2014/717

General Assembly
Security Council

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General Assembly
Sixty-ninth session
Agenda item 35
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Identical letters dated 24 September 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I transmit herewith a statistical summary of Israeli violations of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) committed in August 2014 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 35, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nawaf **Salam**
Ambassador

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Annex to the identical letters dated 24 September 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Land violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
1 August 2014	0800	From within occupied Palestinian territory at point B50-1, opposite the town of Marun al-Ra's, 14 Israeli enemy soldiers crossed the technical fence and installed concertina wire over a distance of 200 metres between the technical fence and the Blue Line, without crossing the latter. They departed into occupied territory at 1315 hours.
2 August 2014	1500	Outside the town of Habbariyah, in the locality of Saddanah, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising three soldiers violated the line of withdrawal by a distance of some 200 metres near observation point OP3 of the Indian contingent in a vain attempt to abduct the shepherd Khidr Atwi while he was grazing his herd. The shepherd fled with his herd in the direction of the town of Shab'a.
	1645	Outside the town of Habbariyah, in the locality of Jabal al-Rus, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising five soldiers violated the line of withdrawal by a distance of some 200 metres in a vain attempt to abduct the shepherd Khidr Nab'ah, who fled in the direction of the town of Shab'a. The incident was witnessed by soldiers from the Indian contingent of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) stationed at observation point OP4.
3 August 2014	0930 1010	From within occupied Palestinian territory, opposite Ayta al-Sha'b, the Israeli enemy used an excavator to repair the dirt road along the technical fence. The arm of the device crossed the fence several times, without crossing the Blue Line.
	1035	Outside the town of Habbariyah, in the locality of Saddanah, an Israeli enemy group comprising 11 soldiers, including three officers holding the ranks of Major General, Colonel and Lieutenant Colonel, violated the line of withdrawal by a distance of some 20 metres within Lebanese territory, entering observation point 3 of the Indian contingent of UNIFIL. The enemy soldiers spoke with the members of the contingent before departing into occupied territory at 1045 hours.
	1120	At point BP12, in Ayta al-Sha'b, an Israeli enemy soldier trained his rifle on a team of the Observer Group Lebanon.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
4 August 2014	1327	Israeli enemy forces used an excavator to clear grass between the technical fence and the Blue Line opposite the town of Mays al-Jabal, near point B68-2. The arm of the excavator crossed the Blue Line.
5 August 2014	1050 1055	Israeli enemy forces used an excavator to clear grass between the technical fence and the Blue Line opposite the town of Mays al-Jabal, near point B66. The arm of the excavator crossed the Blue Line by a distance of approximately one metre. The incident was witnessed by the Nepalese contingent of UNIFIL.
6 August 2014	0800	From within occupied Palestinian territory, between points B63 and B64, opposite Mays al-Jabal, the Israeli enemy used an excavator to repair the dirt road along the technical fence. The arm of the device crossed the fence, without crossing the Blue Line.
	2340	The Israeli enemy fired a flare near the Bastarah farm, within Lebanese territory. The incident was witnessed by UNIFIL.
	2345	The Israeli enemy fired four flares over the Ramta and Summaqah positions within the occupied Shab'a Farms.
7 August 2014	0630	From within occupied Palestinian territory, opposite Lebanese Army Wazzani observation point OP4, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising 11 soldiers, a Merkava tank and a dog crossed the technical fence and reached the river bank in the direction of pole No. 40. At 0700 hours, the tank and the soldiers departed into occupied territory.
	2340	The Israeli enemy fired a flare shell near the Bastarah farm, within Lebanese territory. The incident was witnessed by UNIFIL.
8 August 2014	1550	On the outskirts of Shab'a town, in the locality of Birkat al-Naqqar within Lebanese territory, an Israeli enemy patrol fired shots at civilian As'ad Hamdan while he was grazing his flock. He was not wounded.
	1655	On the outskirts of Shab'a town, three Israeli enemy soldiers violated the line of withdrawal by a distance of some 20 metres into Lebanese territory, advancing on observation point OP3 of the Indian contingent of UNIFIL. They addressed the Indian contingent in a loud voice. At 1710 hours, the enemy soldiers departed into occupied territory.
12 August 2014	1015	South of the town of Yarun between points BP17-1 and BP42, the Israeli enemy used a jackhammer mounted on an excavator to clear grass around the technical fence. The arm of the excavator crossed the Blue Line by a distance of about a metre and cut off some oak tree branches within Lebanese territory.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
13 August 2014	0920	On the outskirts of Shab'a town, near Birkat al-Naqqar, an Israeli enemy patrol fired shots into the air to frighten the shepherd Mahir Hamdan and his herd away from the site. The patrol then fired a smoke bomb outside the technical fence and called out to him to approach. He fled into Shab'a town.
15 August 2014	1430	On the outskirts of Shab'a town, near point OP3 of the Indian contingent of UNIFIL, an Israeli enemy patrol seized a herd of 350 head of goats belonging to the same shepherd, Mahir Hamdan, and led it into occupied territory.
17 August 2014	1200 1300	Light and medium weapon fire was heard in the vicinity of the Summaqah and Ruwaysat al-Alam positions within the occupied Shab'a Farms.
18 August 2014	0855	Within occupied Palestinian territory, between Jisr al-Ghajar and Maysat opposite the Lebanese Army observation point of Wazzani, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising a Hummer vehicle, an excavator and a white pick-up truck approached and cleared and disposed of grass along the technical fence. The arm of the excavator crossed the fence but did not violate the Blue Line.
19 August 2014	0835	Opposite the Lebanese Army centre of Maysat, between Nakhlah and Maysat, the Israeli enemy used an excavator to clear and dispose of grass surrounding the technical fence. The arm of the excavator crossed the technical fence but did not violate the Blue Line.
21 August 2014	1010	Soldiers from an Israeli enemy patrol opposite Labbunah trained their weapons on a Lebanese Army patrol (Lebanese Intelligence Directorate, southern branch) opposite point BP-4.
22 August 2014	1332	In Hawla opposite point BP33, four Israeli enemy soldiers trained their weapons on civilians within Lebanese territory.
24 August 2014	0811	An Israeli enemy soldier hurled a small object, which landed between the technical fence and the Blue Line. It exploded on impact and emitted a sound resembling a burst of gunfire. It was intended to intimidate a female farmer who was at point BP-31 Mays al-Jabal within Lebanese territory.
	1000	Within occupied territory, opposite Abbasiyah town, an Israeli enemy excavator alongside an enemy patrol comprising two Hummer vehicles, a Land Rover vehicle and a pick-up truck, cleared dry grass and water channels. The arm of the excavator crossed the technical fence in the area to which Lebanon maintains a claim.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
25 August 2014	1750	On the outskirts of Shab'a town, near Birkat al-Naqqar, an Israeli enemy patrol aboard a personnel carrier fired shots at an old guard post between the technical fence and the line of withdrawal.
	2215	Israeli enemy forces fired 20 shells that landed in the area between the Litani river and the area south of the towns of Burj al-Muluk and Dayr Mimas within Lebanese territory. The patrol also fired 18 flares over the area.
28 August 2014	1020	Opposite the town of Yarun at point B42, 10 Israeli enemy soldiers crossed the technical fence through the gate and stretched a five-metre black and green plastic tube coating electric cables, from the technical fence to the water channel near the gate. Three of the soldiers then crossed the Blue Line by a distance of about two metres for five minutes. A team from Observer Group Lebanon observed and reported the violation.
31 August 2014	1420	On the outskirts of Shab'a town opposite Birkat al-Naqqar, while two Lebanese shepherds were grazing their herd, the Israeli enemy seized the herd of some 100 head of goats and led it into occupied territory. After a while, the enemy released the herd.
	1630	Tanks, personnel carriers and three Hummer vehicles belonging to the Israeli enemy were observed moving and taking up combat positions around the Ruwaysat al-Alam – Jabal al-Rus position and Birkat al-Naqqar.

Sea violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
13 August 2014	2235	From its position in Ra's al-Naqurah, 400 metres from the shore, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 30 seconds.

Air violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
1 August 2014	0640	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South, Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 0025 hours on 2 August 2014 over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0750	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South, Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1835 hours over Rumaysh.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
2 August 2014	0010	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 0810 hours over Rumaysh.
	0150	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 0435 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0750	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South, Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1835 hours over Rumaysh.
	1710	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil and the South before leaving at 0220 hours on 3 August 2014 hours over Naqurah.
3 August 2014	0150	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 0435 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0625	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South, Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1945 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1120	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1300 hours over Rumaysh.
4 August 2014	0010	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South, Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2025 hours over Rumaysh.
	2025	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South, Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 0220 hours on 5 August 2014 over Rumaysh.
5 August 2014	1220	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil and the South before leaving at 0325 hours on 6 August 2014 over Rumaysh.
6 August 2014	0255	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil and the South before leaving at 1705 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1630	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 0050 hours on 7 August 2014 over Rumaysh.
7 August 2014	0605	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South, Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1700 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1030	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1215 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1610	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 0010 hours on 8 August 2014 over Rumaysh.
8 August 2014	1650	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 0020 hours on 9 August 2014 over Alma al-Sha'b.
9 August 2014	0730	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South, Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1105 hours over Rumaysh.
	0930	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2215 hours over Rumaysh.
10 August 2014	0735	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Beirut, Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2325 hours over Naqurah.
11 August 2014	0510	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1015 hours over Rumaysh.
	1230	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Rashayya, Hasbayya, Marj Uyun, Bint Jubayl and Tyre before leaving at 2210 hours over Rumaysh.
12 August 2014	0700	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1810 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1150	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs, Jubayl, Batrun and Al-Arz before leaving at 1900 hours over Naqurah.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1435	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Shikka. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1515 hours over the sea off Naqurah.
	1610	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and the South before leaving at 0025 hours on 13 August 2014 over Naqurah.
13 August 2014	0820	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil, Iqlim al-Kharrub and Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 2040 hours over Naqurah.
14 August 2014	0220	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 0300 hours on 15 August 2014 over Kafr Killa.
	0625	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil and the South before leaving at 1800 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1025	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1555 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	1035	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1100 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	1040	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Naqurah. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1145 hours over Naqurah.
	2020	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 0300 hours on 15 August 2014 over Kafr Killa.
15 August 2014	0605	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs, Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1900 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1110	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil, Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 2200 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
16 August 2014	0610	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs, Zahlah and Baalbek before leaving at 1910 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
17 August 2014	0710	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1630 hours over Naqurah.
18 August 2014	0740	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South, Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1905 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1035	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1210 hours over the sea off Naqurah.
19 August 2014	0600	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1500 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1035	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Sidon, Jazzin, the Shuf, Alayh, Tyre, Bint Jubayl and Marj Uyun before leaving at 0130 hours on 20 August 2014 over Rumaysh.
20 August 2014	0700	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 2000 hours over Aytarun.
	1000	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs, Jubayl, Batrun and the South before leaving at 1630 hours over Naqurah.
	1125	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Rashayya, Hasbayya, the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 0015 hours on 21 August 2014 over Rumaysh.
21 August 2014	0715	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South, Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 2145 hours over Naqurah.
	1150	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the occupied Shab'a Farms. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil and the North before leaving at 1805 hours over Kafr Killa.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
22 August 2014	0635	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South, Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1810 hours over Kafr Killa.
	0810	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil and the South before leaving at 1830 hours over Kafr Killa.
24 August 2014	0845	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Zahlah, Baalbek and the South before leaving at 1415 hours over Rumaysh.
	1300	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1400 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	2215	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Sahl al-Jarmaq and shelling Lebanese territory.
26 August 2014	0720	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South, Zahlah and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1520 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1015	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Iqlim al-Kharrub and the South before leaving at 1440 hours over Rumaysh.
27 August 2014	0610	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil and the South before leaving at 1700 hours over Rumaysh.
	0845	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil and the South before leaving at 2230 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
28 August 2014	1120	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1230 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1405	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs, Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1610 hours over the Shab'a Farms.
30 August 2014	0600	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1005 hours over Rumaysh.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	0805	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1820 hours over Naqurah.
31 August 2014	0900	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 2000 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0915	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1400 hours over Rumaysh.
	1205	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1335 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.

United Nations A/69/420–S/2014/718

General Assembly
Security Council

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General Assembly
Sixty-ninth session
Agenda items 33 and 38

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

Letter dated 2 October 2014 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

In accordance with instructions received from the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan, I have the honour to draw your attention to ongoing violations of the ceasefire by the Republic of Armenia recorded for September 2014 (see annex). During this period, the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia continued intensive fire from their positions in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan and from the territory of Armenia at the positions of the armed forces of Azerbaijan, as well as at populated areas and civilian objects situated in the vicinity of the front line. As a result, two Azerbaijani servicemen were killed and one serviceman was wounded.

Azerbaijan strongly condemns the incessant attempts by Armenia to escalate the situation on the front line and its continued and deliberate attacks on populated areas and civilian objects.

Azerbaijan reserves its legitimate right to take appropriate measures to protect its population from the aggressor and respond to the ongoing violations of the ceasefire and other provocative acts.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 33 and 38, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Husniyya **Mammadova**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.
Counsellor

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Annex to the letter dated 2 October 2014 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia for September 2014[a]

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
1.	1 September	0330-0340	Kuropatkino and Minakhorlu villages (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
2.		1230-1245	Karagullar village (Dashkesen district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
3.	2 September	0030-0035	Merzili and Tazakend villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
4.		0110-0120	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
5.		0350-0355	Mehdili and Jojug Marjanly villages (Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan)	AK and DShK	–
6.		0400-0410	Garakhanbeyli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
7.		2030-2100	Levonarkh village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
8.	4 September	0240-0245	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
9.		2150-2205	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	PK	–
10.		2310-2320	Shuraabad village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
11.	5 September	1545-1620	Aygedzor village (Berd district, Armenia) and Aghdam village (Tovuz district, Azerbaijan)	DShK	–
12.		2225-2235	Saryjaly village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
13.		2330-2335	Shuraabad village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
14.	6 September	0220-0230	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–

No.	Date	Time	Direction (locality)	Weapons used	Casualties and damages
15.	7 September	2020-2025	Novruzlu village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	PK	–
16.		2210-2215	Kuropatkino and Minakhorlu villages (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
17.	8 September	0200-0205	Javahirli village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
18.		0215-0220	Bash Garvand village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
19.		0310-0320	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
20.		0550-0610	Aghdag Mountain (Dashkesen district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
21.	10 September	1400-1430	Zingirli Mountain (Dashkesen district, Azerbaijan)	DShK	–
22.		1640-1722	Goranboy district, Azerbaijan at an altitude of 2832,1 m.	DShK	–
23.		2355-0000	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
24.	11 September	0120-0130	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
25.		0255-0300	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
26.		0330-0335	Mehdili and Jojug Marjanly villages (Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
27.	12 September	0125-0135	Kuropatkino and Minakhorlu villages (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
28.		0400-0405	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
29.		0410-0415	Mehdili and Jojug Marjanly villages (Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
30.		0710-0720	Garakhanbeyli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
31.	13 September	0255-0330	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
32.		1000-1035	Zingirli Mountain (Dashkesen district, Azerbaijan)	AK and PK	–

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
33.		1105-1125	Aghdag Mountain (Dashkesen district, Azerbaijan)	AK and PK	–
34.		1310-1340	Zingirli Mountain (Dashkesen district, Azerbaijan)	AK and PK	–
35.		2310-2320	Mehdili and Jojug Marjanly villages (Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
36.	14 September	0310-0325	Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK and PK	–
37.	15 September	0310-0325	Saryjaly village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
38.		0320-0325	Novruzlu village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM	–
39.		0345-0350	Mehdili and Jojug Marjanly villages (Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan)	AK and DShK	–
40.	16 September	0340-0350	Shirvanly village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM	–
41.		2330-2335	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
42.		2335	Chinari village (Berd district, Armenia) and Kokhanabi village (Tovuz district, Azerbaijan)	RPK	–
43.	17 September	0115-0120	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
44.		0215-0225	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
45.	18 September	0450-0455	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
46.		1405-1415	Novruzlu village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
47.		2030-2040	Garagashly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
48.	19 September	0015-0020	Kuropatkino and Minakhorlu villages (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
49.		0040-0045	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–

No.	Date	Time	Direction (locality)	Weapons used	Casualties and damages
50.		0042-0430	Merzili and Tazakend villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
51.		1320-1325	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
52.		1530-1535	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
53.	20 September	0140-0150	Kuropatkino and Minakhorlu villages (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
54.		1005-1025	Aghdag Mountain (Dashkesen district, Azerbaijan)	DShK	–
55.	21 September	0305-0320	Levonarkh village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
56.		0505-0515	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
57.		0515-0520	Kuropatkino and Minakhorlu villages (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
58.	22 September	0510-0515	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM	–
59.	23 September	0025-0030	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM	–
60.		0410-0420	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
61.		0430-0450	Kuropatkino and Minakhorlu villages (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK and PK	–
62.		0945-0950	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
63.		1430	From the altitudes of Khojavand district, Azerbaijan	SVD	A serviceman of the armed forces of Azerbaijan was killed
64.		1635-1640	Ashaghy Seyidahmedli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
65.		2230-2240	Kuropatkino and Minakhorlu villages (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–

No.	Date	Time	Direction (locality)	Weapons used	Casualties and damages
66.	24 September	0035-0040	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
67.		2215-2220	Kengerli village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
68.		2220-2225	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
69.		2240-2255	Saryjaly village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM	–
70.	25 September	0635-0640	Javahirli village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
71.		1100-1103	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
72.		2319-2340	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
73.		2332-2340	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AKM	–
74.	26 September	0305-0315	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
75.		1420-1435	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
76.		1505-1510	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
77.	27 September	0045-0100	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
78.		0105-0110	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
79.		0135-0150	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
80.		0145-0155	Berkaber village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Gyzylhajyly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
81.		1025	Fizuli district, Azerbaijan	SVD	A serviceman of the armed forces of Azerbaijan was killed

No.	Date	Time	Direction (locality)	Weapons used	Casualties and damages
82.		1445	Garakhanbeyli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	–	A serviceman of the armed forces of Azerbaijan was wounded
83.		1725-1730	Kuropatkino and Minakhorlu villages (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AKM	–
84.	28 September	0120-0130	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
85.		0145-0200	Merzili and Tazakend villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
86.		0145-0200	Kuropatkino and Minakhorlu villages (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
87.		0145-0200	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
88.		0215-0225	Kuropatkino and Minakhorlu villages (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
89.		0215-0220	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
90.		0230-0240	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
91.		0320-0340	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
92.		0600-0610	Shykhlar village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
93.		1440-1445	Berkaber village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Gyzylhajyly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
94.		2035-2050	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
95.		2315-2325	Berkaber village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Gyzylhajyly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
96.	29 September	0200-0220	Javahirli village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–
97.		2105-2110	Chinari village (Berd district, Armenia) and Kokhanabi village (Tovuz district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
98.	30 September	1035-1055	Aghdag Mountain (Dashkesen district, Azerbaijan)	AK and DShK	–
99.		1620-1625	Aygepar village (Berd district, Armenia) and Alibeyli village (Tovuz district, Azerbaijan)	AK	–

Abbreviations: AK — Kalashnikov assault rifle; AKM — modernized Kalashnikov assault rifle; DShK — heavy machine gun; PK — Kalashnikov machine gun; PKM — modernized Kalashnikov machine gun; RPG — handheld anti-tank grenade launcher; RPK — light Kalashnikov machine gun; SVD — sniper rifle; ZSU — anti-aircraft vehicle; F-1 — hand grenade.

[a] Settlements of the Republic of Azerbaijan included in this information are under occupation by the Republic of Armenia or situated close to the fire point areas.

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Agenda items 32 and 107

Prevention of armed conflict

Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Identical letters dated 3 October 2014 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I wish to transmit the following information.

The Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated yesterday that his policy on Syria was focused on changing the Syrian regime. In that context, he submitted to Parliament a memorandum that would authorize the Government to take military action inside Syria and make Turkey a base for military aggression against the country, citing the pretexts of counter-terrorism and Turkish national security.

The stated course of action of the Turkish Government is a bare-faced violation of the Charter of the United Nations, which sets forth the principles of respect for national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of States. It constitutes an explicit attack on a founder member of the United Nations. The international community and, in particular, the Security Council must take action to curb the adventurism of the Turkish leadership, which poses a threat to regional and international peace and security.

Since the outset of the current crisis in Syria, the Turkish Government has done all that it can to exacerbate the situation and to undermine Syria's exemplary stability and harmony.

In the light of the principles of neighbourly relations between States, and the historic relations between the Turkish and Syrian peoples, Turkey ought to have helped Syria to overcome the crisis. Instead, the Turkish Government has become the main linchpin of the armed terrorist groups, whose extremist religious ideology it shares.

The Turkish leadership has offered all forms of political, military and logistical support to the armed terrorist groups. It has harboured, funded, trained and

armed terrorists from over 83 States, facilitating their passage into Syria. Turkey has thus become a vital base for the terrorists who have struck the country. The Turkish Government bears fundamental responsibility for every drop of blood that the groups have spilled in Syria.

The Turkish Government has not only killed Syrians and destroyed their towns and villages; it has lashed out against the country's development and all that Syrians have achieved with their own sweat and blood. It has dismantled and removed Syrian factories and workshops, acting with the full cooperation of armed terrorist gangs. In one of the most striking examples of its collusion with the gangs, the Turkish leadership has bought Syrian oil that was stolen by Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL) and other terrorist groups.

The Turkish Government continues to fully support armed terrorist groups, including ISIL and the Nusrah Front, in flagrant violation of Security Council resolutions 2170 (2014) and 2178 (2014). It can therefore make no claim to being a partner in combating terrorism. It bears fundamental responsibility for the growth of terrorist activity, and its ties to the terrorist groups have been documented. The charade of the abduction and release of Turkish consular officials in Mosul is the most telling sign of the deep partnership between the Government of the Justice and Development Party and the ISIL gangs.

The Syrian people has been steadfast in the face of killings, and has made great sacrifices. It has the exclusive right to choose its leaders and determine its future, and has expressed its will through the presidential elections. Under no circumstances will it allow the Turkish Government, or any other Government, to intervene in its affairs. More than ever before, the people is resolute in standing up to all plots against its unity and integrity. It will protect its sovereignty and its independent national choice.

By adopting reckless policies and openly attacking Syria, the Turkish leadership has been instrumental in perpetuating the crisis in Syria and the shedding of Syrian blood. It has endangered peace and security throughout the region and the world, and Turkey will not be spared the consequences. The international community and the Security Council must take a genuine stand and adopt a firm, responsible position. They must curb the Turkish Government's destructive approach, and prevail on it to comply with Security Council resolutions and end its unfettered support for the armed terrorist groups. They must insist that Turkey bring an end to its interference in the internal affairs of the Syrian Arab Republic.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter issued as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 32 and 107, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Haydar Ali **Ahmad**
Counsellor
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

United Nations S/2014/720

Security Council

Distr.: General
7 October 2014

Original: English

Twentieth semi-annual report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004)

I. Background

1. The present report is my twentieth semi-annual report on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004). It provides a review and an assessment of the process of the implementation of the resolution since my previous report on the subject was issued on 24 April 2014 (S/2014/296). I note herein the continued lack of progress on key provisions of the resolution and highlight increasing concerns about pressure on the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Lebanon. While recognizing the efforts of the Prime Minister, Tammam Salam, and the Government, I highlight the need to elect the new President and underline the continued impact of the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic on Lebanon and the challenges to efforts to uphold the Lebanese policy of disassociation from the Syrian crisis.

2. In response to the political situation in Lebanon, the Security Council, in a presidential statement adopted on 29 May 2014 (S/PRST/2014/10), expressed disappointment and concern that the presidential elections had not been conducted within the time frame set out in the Constitution. The Council appealed to all Lebanese parties to preserve national unity in the face of attempts to undermine the country's stability, consistent with their commitment in the Baabda Declaration, and stressed the importance for all Lebanese parties to respect the Lebanese policy of disassociation. On 26 September, the International Support Group for Lebanon looked to the leaders of Lebanon to show the sense of urgency and flexibility needed to open the way for the presidential elections to be held without further delay.

3. Following a time of relative calm after the formation of the Government, Lebanon witnessed further challenges to its security situation during the reporting period, including five terrorist attacks involving improvised explosive devices and car bombs that left at least three people dead and tens injured. There were also at least 15 attacks by the Syrian air force on the area around the Lebanese town of Aarsal, close to the Syrian-Lebanese border. Cross-border shooting, shelling and rocket attacks from the Syrian Arab Republic into Lebanon regularly took place, causing death and injury. Until his term as President of Lebanon ended on 25 May, Michel Sleiman maintained his calls for all Lebanese parties to disassociate

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themselves from the war in the Syrian Arab Republic and to respect their commitment to the principles of the Baabda Declaration.

4. The impact of the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic on the security and stability of Lebanon was unmistakeable during the reporting period. In its press statement of 4 August (SC/11507), the Security Council condemned an attack begun on 2 August by violent extremist groups on the Lebanese armed forces and internal security forces in the area of Aarsal, which had caused some 100 fatalities and numerous injuries by 7 August when it ended. The Lebanese army and security forces suffered additional casualties in other attacks against them, but remained robust and resilient in tackling multiple security challenges. There were some positive developments linked to the implementation of security plans in Tripoli and the Bekaa.

5. On 17 June, the Government of Italy hosted a ministerial conference on international support for the Lebanese armed forces under my auspices in the context of the International Support Group. The participants acknowledged the extraordinary pressure on the armed forces and the need to provide additional international support, in line with the army's capabilities development plan.

6. Lebanon, in territory the smallest of the countries neighbouring the Syrian Arab Republic, continues to host the largest number of refugees per capita in the world, including 1.2 million registered refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic. While its support for the refugees remains unabated, Lebanon is facing significant humanitarian and socioeconomic challenges as a result of the Syrian crisis, with recent security developments further increasing the pressure. The United Nations and the Government of Lebanon continue to work closely together to mobilize greater assistance to help Lebanon to respond to the crisis.

II. Implementation of resolution 1559 (2004)

7. Since the adoption of resolution 1559 (2004) on 2 September 2004, several of its provisions have been implemented, as highlighted in my previous reports. Presidential and parliamentary elections were conducted freely and fairly in 2008 and 2009. The Syrian Arab Republic withdrew its troops and military assets from Lebanon in April 2005. Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic established full diplomatic relations in 2009.

8. During the reporting period, the Prime Minister continued to affirm the country's respect for all United Nations resolutions. The conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic and its corresponding impact on Lebanon, however, continued to limit progress in the implementation of the outstanding provisions of resolution 1559 (2004) and other resolutions pertaining to Lebanon.

9. The delineation of the Syrian-Lebanese border, which was strongly encouraged by the Security Council in its resolution 1680 (2006), remains pending. Moreover, the existence and activities of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias along the border continue to pose a threat to the stability of the country and the region, highlighting the need for the Government and the armed forces to step up their efforts to provide stability and to reach a full monopoly on the possession of weapons and the use of force throughout Lebanon.

10. My representatives and I remained in regular contact with all parties in Lebanon during the reporting period, as well as with relevant regional and international leaders. I spoke to the President on 25 May to pay tribute to his leadership during his tenure and to laud his commitment to the unity and stability of Lebanon, including through the International Support Group and the implementation of relevant United Nations resolutions. I regret that no sessions of the National Dialogue have been convened since the most recent session on 5 May, given that I remain convinced that the disarmament of armed groups in Lebanon, in particular Hizbullah, can be best achieved through a Lebanese-led, cross-party political process. I encourage Lebanese leaders to continue their discussion of a national defence strategy and to achieve tangible progress. I also met the Prime Minister on 26 September and highlighted the importance of continued and united international support for the security and stability of Lebanon and the critical need for greater assistance to help the country to meet the exceptional challenges that it faces.

A. Sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon

11. Resolution 1559 (2004) aims at strengthening the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government of Lebanon throughout the country, in line with the Taif Agreement of 1989, to which all the political parties in Lebanon committed themselves. This objective has remained the highest priority of my efforts to facilitate the implementation of all resolutions pertaining to Lebanon.

12. I am concerned by the failure to elect the new President. The mandate of Michel Sleiman as President ended on 25 May, leaving the position of Head of State vacant for more than four months and increasing the country's vulnerability in the face of mounting security, economic and humanitarian challenges. I commend the efforts of the Prime Minister and the Government to ensure the continuity of State institutions and call upon Lebanese politicians to elect the new President without further delay, in the interest of all communities in Lebanon.

13. In its resolution 1680 (2006), the Security Council strongly encouraged the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to respond positively to the request by the Government of Lebanon to delineate their common border. I continue to call upon the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon to achieve the full delineation of their common border. Given the continuing conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, however, progress has been even more difficult to achieve in this regard and no tangible steps were taken by either side in this regard during the reporting period.

14. The delineation and demarcation of the boundaries of Lebanon remain elements essential to guaranteeing national sovereignty and territorial integrity. They also remain critical to facilitating proper border control. The complex security situation along the Syrian-Lebanese border in the current circumstances, including continuing reports of cross-border fighting and movement of arms and people, further underlines the continued urgency of demarcating the border. While acknowledging the bilateral nature of border delineation, progress on this matter remains an obligation of the two countries under Security Council resolution 1680 (2006), derived from resolution 1559 (2004).

15. On 2 August, in the most serious threat yet to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon from the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, a group of Syrian fighters, including extremist elements from the Nusra Front and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), attacked Lebanese army positions in Aarsal. The incident followed the arrest by the Lebanese army of a Syrian commander of one of the militant groups, Imad Jomaa, earlier in the day. Fighting continued until 7 August, when the armed forces and internal security forces regained control of the town after a ceasefire had been agreed upon. The precise number of fatalities remains unclear, although reports suggest some 100 deaths, including 19 soldiers, various militants and several civilians. During the withdrawal of the militants, 19 soldiers and 16 members of the internal security forces were taken hostage. Since their withdrawal, the militants have released 10 members of the internal security forces and four soldiers. I condemn the beheading of two of the hostages, both soldiers, allegedly by ISIL, and the execution of a third, a soldier, reportedly by the Nusra Front.

16. During the reporting period, at least 23 cross-border shelling incidents and rocket attacks causing injuries and material damage were reported in north-east Lebanon. On 17 June, Syrian refugees and Lebanese residents who had fled violence across the border were displaced from the Lebanese village of Tufail by shelling originating from the Syrian side of the border. During the same period, there were reports of 22 air raids by the Syrian air force on Lebanese territory, causing at least five deaths and more than 20 injuries. The Lebanese authorities have consistently highlighted the need to defend Lebanon from such attacks and on 25 July the armed forces responded by firing back at the Syrian aircraft that had violated Lebanese sovereignty.

17. The continued occupation by the Israel Defense Forces of the northern part of the village of Ghajar and an adjacent area north of the Blue Line stands in violation of the sovereignty of Lebanon and resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1701 (2006). My representatives and I continue to engage closely with both parties with a view to facilitating the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the area in implementation of resolution 1701 (2006).

18. There was no progress in relation to the issue of the Shab'a Farms area during the reporting period. Neither the Syrian Arab Republic nor Israel has yet responded with regard to the provisional definition of the area contained in my report on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006), issued on 30 October 2007 (S/2007/641).

19. Unmanned aerial vehicles and fixed-wing aircraft, including fighter jets, of the Israeli armed forces continued to make almost daily overflights of Lebanon during the reporting period, in violation of Lebanese sovereignty and resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1701 (2006). The Government of Lebanon has repeatedly protested against the violations. I have deplored them and demanded that they cease immediately. The Israeli authorities, in turn, claim that the overflights are carried out for security reasons.

B. Extension of control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory

20. The Government of Lebanon has reiterated to the United Nations its intention to extend State authority over all Lebanese territory, as called for in the Taif

Agreement and resolution 1559 (2004). The armed forces and internal security forces have played a crucial role in implementing this commitment under difficult circumstances. The ability of the Lebanese State to fully exercise its authority over all its territory continues to be challenged, however. I welcome the Government's commitment to building the capabilities of the army and security forces and the international assistance pledged to date, including $3 billion by Saudi Arabia in March 2014 in cooperation with France, and reiterate the need for continued international support to be provided to the authorities and the armed forces.

21. During the reporting period, several incidents challenged national security, most of which were linked directly or indirectly to the war in the Syrian Arab Republic. Concern remains at the involvement of Lebanese fighters in the Syrian Arab Republic, including those of Hizbullah. On 5 May, at the most recent session of the National Dialogue, the participants reaffirmed their commitment to the Baabda Declaration and the Lebanese policy of disassociation. Hizbullah and the Lebanese Forces did not attend, however. Hizbullah continued to publicly acknowledge its sustained involvement in the fighting in the Syrian Arab Republic including, most recently, on 15 August during a speech by its leader, Hassan Nasrallah. Hizbullah also held funerals for its fighters killed in the Syrian Arab Republic.

22. At least five terrorist incidents occurred in Lebanon during the reporting period. On 31 May, an improvised explosive device detonated in Aarsal, injuring at least two people. A suicide car bomb attack on a checkpoint mounted by the internal security forces on 20 June in Dahr el Baidar killed a police officer and injured at least 30 others. On 24 June, a suicide bombing in the Tayouneh area of southern Beirut killed an officer of the General Security Directorate and injured at least 20 civilians. On 25 June, a militant blew himself up and injured at least 10 people during a security raid on a hotel in the Ras Beirut area of the capital. On 6 August, at least 1 person was killed and 10 others wounded in a bombing in Tripoli, amid reports that the blast had targeted an army patrol. Such violent incidents reflect the widespread proliferation of weapons held by non-State actors and the significant threat that such weapons pose to national peace and security.

23. The armed forces and other security agencies faced direct attacks against their personnel during the reporting period, including the events of 2-7 August in Aarsal. On 24 April, five soldiers were wounded in an ambush outside Aarsal by armed militants. On 16 May, three members of the internal security forces were wounded in a grenade attack in Aarsal. Eight soldiers were wounded in Tripoli on 20 May when armed men shot at them and attacked them with grenades. An armed forces bus was shot at in Tripoli on 5 August and, on the following day, an improvised explosive device targeting an army checkpoint exploded, killing 1 civilian and injuring 11 others. Most recently, two soldiers were killed and at least three others wounded in a roadside bomb attack close to Aarsal on 19 September.

24. The security agencies responded robustly and resiliently to some of the security challenges facing the country. The implementation of security plans for the northern city of Tripoli and areas of the Bekaa led to the successful detention of several individuals wanted on various charges, including in connection with previous outbreaks of violence in Tripoli. The detention of others in relation to terrorism included the arrests of Sheikh Omar Bakri Fustoq on 25 May and Imad

Jomaa on 2 August. Furthermore, while the situation remains fragile, there have been no significant outbreaks of violence in Tripoli since my previous report.

25. Efforts to further increase the capabilities of the armed forces and their ability to tackle multiple challenges, including internal security, continued. In the press statement of 4 August, the Security Council expressed its support for the armed forces and internal security forces in their efforts to combat terrorism and in preventing attempts to undermine the security of Lebanon, in addition to highlighting the need to further build the capabilities of the security forces to counter terrorism and other security challenges. I welcome the commitments by several Member States to providing further support to the security forces, including for counter-terrorism and border protection efforts. I particularly welcome a further donation of $1 billion from Saudi Arabia, announced by the former Prime Minister, Saad Hariri, two days before his visit to Lebanon on 8 August after a prolonged absence.

26. The situation in the area of operations of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon remained generally stable, notwithstanding the incidents detailed in my most recent report on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) (S/2014/438). In my next report on that subject, I will provide details on subsequent incidents, including the launching of rockets and Israeli retaliatory fire.

27. With regard to the border of Lebanon with the Syrian Arab Republic, there continued to be reports of arms trafficking in both directions. Several Member States continued to express deep concern over the illegal transfer of weapons across the land borders. Israeli officials stated that they would act to prevent advanced weapons systems from being transferred to Hizbullah from the Syrian Arab Republic. Senior representatives of Hizbullah, for their part, maintained their position that they had no intention of acquiring chemical weapons. The Lebanese authorities indicated that the land border between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic remained difficult to control, but that the Lebanese armed forces had been deployed and were seeking to tighten control along the border to the best of their ability. While the United Nations has no independent means of verifying reports of cross-border arms smuggling, I have repeatedly expressed my concerns about the risks to both countries.

28. To tackle continuing cross-border incidents and in the context of reports of arms smuggling, there remains an urgent need to improve the management and control of the land borders of Lebanon. This is also necessary to prevent armed groups and militias in Lebanon from expanding their weapons arsenal, given that such expansion constitutes a threat to national and regional peace. Donor coordination with the authorities on integrated border management is under way. I reiterate my calls upon all Member States to renew efforts to meet their obligations under Security Council resolutions to take the measures necessary to prevent the transfer of arms to groups outside the control of the Government of Lebanon.

C. Disbanding and disarmament of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias

29. In its resolution 1559 (2004), the Security Council called for the disarming and disbanding of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias. This remains a key provision of the resolution that has not yet been implemented. It reflects and reaffirms a

decision to which all Lebanese committed themselves in the Taif Agreement, which led at the time to Lebanese militias, with the exception of Hizbullah, giving up their weapons. Given the current national context and the growing impact of the Syrian crisis on Lebanon, it is critical that this agreement be preserved and implemented by all in order to avoid the spectre of a renewed confrontation among the Lebanese and to strengthen the institutions of State.

30. Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias within the country continue to operate outside the control of the Government, in serious violation of resolution 1559 (2004). While several groups across the political spectrum in Lebanon possess weapons outside government control, the armed component of Hizbullah is the most significant and most heavily armed Lebanese militia in the country. The maintenance of arms by Hizbullah and other groups poses a serious challenge to the State's ability to exercise full sovereignty and authority over its territory. In addition, several Palestinian armed groups continue to operate in the country inside and outside the refugee camps.

31. Since my previous report, there has been no tangible progress towards the disbanding and disarming of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, as called for in the Taif Agreement and resolution 1559 (2004). Since the adoption of that resolution, no specific steps have been taken to tackle this crucial issue, which lies at the heart of the sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon. Several Lebanese groups and individuals continue to speak up against the maintenance by Hizbullah of a military arsenal, which they consider a destabilizing factor in the country and contradictory to democracy. Many Lebanese see the continued existence of such arms as an implicit threat for use within Lebanon for political reasons.

32. I have repeatedly expressed my deep concern to Lebanese leaders about the serious risks that armed groups pose to the stability of the country and the region. I have urged them to tackle this matter without further delay, given that it is their obligation under Security Council resolution 1559 (2004). In a democratic State, it is a fundamental anomaly that a political party maintains its own militia. Nonetheless, Hizbullah has continued to acknowledge openly that it maintains and expands a substantial military capacity separate from that of the Lebanese State. It further claims that its arms serve as a deterrent against potential aggression from Israel. Israeli officials continue to express concern at the alleged maintenance by Hizbullah of unauthorized weapons and the presence of armed personnel in civilian areas in the south of Lebanon.

33. The presence of armed extremist militants in Lebanon, as witnessed in the incident in Aarsal and highlighted by the arrests of individuals wanted on terrorism-related charges by the Lebanese security forces, is deeply worrying. The violence and terrorist acts during the reporting period cost many lives and caused great suffering and fear to many innocent Lebanese, affecting all communities nationwide. Reports of groups in Lebanese communities carrying arms to protect themselves for fear of attack by such groups as the Nusra Front and ISIL are also deeply worrying.

34. I have long supported the National Dialogue as the best way to deal with the issue of arms and achieve the ultimate goal of no weapons or armed forces in Lebanon other than those of the Lebanese State. I am concerned that, with no Head of State, momentum on building consensus and a unified vision on the issue will be

lost in the coming period. Since the end of the mandate of Michel Sleiman, no further sessions of the National Dialogue have been scheduled.

35. During the reporting period, the security situation in the Palestine refugee camps remained generally stable, with the exception of a few violent incidents. From 12 to 14 May, intermittent clashes between factions in the Ein el-Hillweh camp left one person dead. On 19 May, a bomb exploded in an attempt to assassinate an official from the Fatah movement in the camp, injuring three people. On 30 June, armed clashes in the Shatila camp left 2 people dead and more than 10 injured. In a positive development, a joint Palestinian security force, comprising some 150 members of various groups, began its first deployment within the Ein el-Hillweh camp on 8 July.

36. Humanitarian conditions for Palestine refugees in Lebanon are increasingly dire, with the influx of an additional 44,000 refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic since the beginning of the crisis placing tremendous further pressure on the overall situation in the camps and gatherings, in addition to the efforts of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) to assist them. UNRWA has taken measures to reduce tension between the Palestine refugees who have been residing in Lebanon and those arriving from the Syrian Arab Republic by, for example, including refugee children in regular classes in UNRWA schools. The United Nations has continued to urge the Lebanese authorities to improve the living conditions of the refugees. This should be done without prejudice to the eventual resolution of the Palestine refugee question in the context of a comprehensive peace agreement in the region, and bearing in mind the detrimental effects of dismal living conditions on the wider security situation.

37. The presence of Palestinian armed groups outside the camps continues to challenge the ability of Lebanon to exercise full sovereignty over its territory. Notwithstanding the decision taken in 2006 by the National Dialogue and confirmed in subsequent sessions, no progress was made during the reporting period with regard to dismantling the military bases of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Fatah al-Intifada in the country. All but one of the bases are located along the Syrian-Lebanese border. Their presence continues to undermine Lebanese sovereignty and governmental authority and makes delineation of the border more difficult. It poses a serious challenge to the effective control of the eastern border between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic. I have reiterated my calls upon the Lebanese authorities for the implementation of earlier decisions of the National Dialogue, specifically those relating to the dismantling of the above-mentioned military bases, and upon the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to cooperate with those efforts in good faith.

III. Observations

38. I continue to be disappointed at the lack of further tangible progress towards the implementation of the remaining provisions of resolution 1559 (2004). Lebanon continues to face serious challenges to its stability and security, both internally and along its borders with the Syrian Arab Republic, including from terrorism and extremist groups, arms smuggling and further influxes of refugees. I am also concerned that continued stagnation in the implementation of the resolution could lead to the erosion of provisions already implemented and contribute to a further

deterioration in the stability of Lebanon. I reiterate my firm conviction that it is in the best interest of Lebanon and the Lebanese to make progress towards the full implementation of the resolution for the long-term stability of the country and the region.

39. I have repeatedly condemned the continued violation of the sovereignty of Lebanon, including the many incidents in which civilians have been killed or injured on the Lebanese side of the border because of the actions of warring parties in the Syrian Arab Republic. The reporting period witnessed the most serious threat yet to Lebanese sovereignty and territorial integrity from the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, in the context of the attack on the armed forces and security forces in Aarsal from 2 to 7 August by armed extremist groups involved in the fighting in the Syrian Arab Republic. Reports of continued activity by the Nusra Front and ISIL in the mountainous area around Aarsal are deeply worrying. I condemn the continuation of cross-border shelling and rocket attacks by various groups in the Syrian Arab Republic and the air raids by the Syrian air force on Lebanese territory, which are a further violation of Lebanese sovereignty. I continue to call upon all parties, including the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1559 (2004).

40. Since 24 April, there have been five terrorist attacks in Lebanon, including those carried out by groups claiming that they are acting in response to the participation of Hizbullah in the fighting in the Syrian Arab Republic. I remain deeply concerned by the failure of various elements to cease involvement in that fighting and in particular the acknowledged participation by Hizbullah of its role therein. The participation by Hizbullah and other Lebanese elements in the fighting in the Syrian Arab Republic and the actions in Lebanon of extremist armed groups, including ISIL and the Nusra Front, that are based in the Syrian Arab Republic have had a significant impact on security and stability in the country. Such developments highlight that there is a continued need to uphold the principles of the Baabda Declaration and the policy of disassociation and for Lebanese parties to step back from their involvement in the Syrian Arab Republic.

41. The fear of the presence in Lebanon of armed militants from the Syrian Arab Republic is increasing. The deplorable acts of brutality by such groups, including the beheading of two Lebanese soldiers by ISIL, the execution of a third, reportedly by the Nusra Front, and sectarian violence elsewhere in the region, have caused fear among Lebanese communities. Reports of the formation of armed groups to protect local communities are deeply worrying and would run counter to the spirit of resolution 1559 (2004). Further unity and moderation between the various communities in Lebanon will, I hope, contribute to the country's strength and resilience.

42. I have repeatedly cautioned that the widespread proliferation of weapons outside the control of the State, combined with the continued existence of heavily armed militias, undermines the security of Lebanese citizens. The maintenance by Hizbullah of sizeable and sophisticated military capabilities outside the control of the Government of Lebanon remains a matter of grave concern, in particular because it creates an atmosphere of intimidation and represents a key challenge to the safety of Lebanese civilians and to the government monopoly on the legitimate use of force. I reiterate my call upon Hizbullah and all other parties concerned not to

engage in any militant activity inside or outside Lebanon, consistent with the requirements of the Taif Agreement and resolution 1559 (2004).

43. I continue to urge the Government and armed forces of Lebanon to take all measures necessary to prohibit Hizbullah and other armed groups from acquiring weapons and building paramilitary capacity outside the authority of the State, in violation of resolution 1559 (2004). I also call upon countries in the region that maintain close ties with Hizbullah to encourage the transformation of the armed group into a solely political party and its disarmament, consistent with the requirements of the Taif Agreement and resolution 1559 (2004), in the best interest of Lebanon and regional peace and security.

44. I commend the efforts of the armed forces to robustly confront multiple security challenges throughout the country and to protect the stability and security of Lebanon. They have made progress in tackling terrorist threats, despite suffering losses, and deployed robustly in all conflict-affected areas. The implementation of security plans in Tripoli and the Bekaa has produced positive results, which need to be consolidated and built on, including in efforts to combat terrorism. I welcome the unified support across the political spectrum behind the Prime Minister and the Government for the army and security forces in the immediate aftermath of the crisis in Aarsal. I also encourage the continued support of the international community, including through the International Support Group for Lebanon, and note the provision of assistance and equipment for the armed forces. I also welcome the commitment of $1 billion by Saudi Arabia on 6 August to help to build counter-terrorism capacity in Lebanon, made in addition to its pledge of $3 billion in March 2014.

45. I am deeply concerned by the situation of Palestine refugees in the camps and the additional pressure being placed on the limited resources available in the light of the presence of Palestine refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic who have fled the violence there. I reiterate my call upon donors to support UNRWA and its vital work in providing services to Palestine refugees in Lebanon. I note the formation of a Palestinian joint security force in the Ein el-Hillweh camp. Strong cooperation between the Lebanese authorities and the Palestinian security forces in the camps has been crucial in ensuring that security incidents are brought under control swiftly.

46. I regret the absence of any progress on the delineation and demarcation of the border with the Syrian Arab Republic, which has a significant impact on border control. I remain of the view that integrated border management will, in the longer term, contribute significantly to better control of the borders of Lebanon and help to prevent the illegal transfer of weapons and fighters in both directions. This has become even more pressing in the context of events in the Syrian Arab Republic. I call upon donors to continue their support for border management.

47. The continued violations by Israel of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon, most conspicuously the overflights of Lebanese territory by Israeli aircraft, are deplorable. I reiterate my call upon Israel to adhere to its obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions and to withdraw its forces from the northern part of the village of Ghajar and an adjacent area north of the Blue Line, as well as to cease its overflights of Lebanese airspace, which undermine the credibility of the Lebanese security services and generate anxiety among the civilian population. Recent incidents along the Blue Line, as detailed in my reports on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006), underscore the importance of ensuring

that the situation there remains calm. I commend the Lebanese and Israeli armed forces for their efforts to reduce tensions and for the support and coordination of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon in this regard.

48. I am disappointed at the failure to elect the new President within the time frame set out in the Constitution and concerned that the presidency has remained vacant for more than four months. I commend the leadership of Michel Sleiman in steering Lebanon through multiple challenges to national unity. Leaving the position of Head of State vacant increases the country's vulnerability to mounting security, economic and humanitarian challenges. While I commend the efforts of the Prime Minister and the Government to ensure the continuity of State institutions, I call upon Lebanese politicians to elect the new President without further delay, in the interest of all communities in Lebanon. Holding a free and fair presidential election, in the spirit of resolution 1559 (2004), is a key element in preserving democratic institutions.

49. The security of Lebanon must prevail, as must national peace, without intimidation by armed groups. The maintenance of weapons by armed groups, including Hizbullah, outside State control is in contradiction to the Taif Agreement and incompatible with the democratic process. I note the Cabinet's approval, on 19 August, of a decree to hold parliamentary elections.

50. With Lebanon hosting the largest number of refugees per capita in the world, recent security developments, especially in the eastern border region, have put even greater pressure on the refugees, the host communities that receive them and the country more broadly, necessitating further support from the international community. I welcome the activation of the multi-donor trust fund with the help of the World Bank and strongly encourage Member States to fulfil their burden-sharing responsibilities by contributing generously through this and other mechanisms.

51. I remain firmly committed to the implementation of resolution 1559 (2004) for the sake of peace and security during a particularly difficult and challenging time for Lebanon and the region. I therefore count on the continued commitment of the Government to its international obligations and call upon all parties and actors to fully abide by resolutions 1559 (2004), 1680 (2006) and 1701 (2006). I further call upon Member States to renew efforts to support Lebanon in ensuring respect for its obligations under those resolutions as the best way to advance the country's long-term prosperity and stability as a democratic State. I will continue my efforts towards the full implementation of those and all other resolutions pertaining to Lebanon.

United Nations S/2014/721

Security Council

Distr.: General
7 October 2014

Original: English

Identical letters dated 7 October 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I am writing in response to slanderous allegations made by the Palestinian representative in a letter to the Security Council dated 2 October 2014. In the letter, he writes that on 22 September 2014, "Israeli occupying forces assassinated two Palestinians, Marwan Kawasme and Amar Abu Aysha".

The Palestinian representative has once again obscured the facts by intentionally trying to portray two murderous terrorists as innocent bystanders. Surprise, surprise — his letter mysteriously omits a number of critical facts, namely: the individuals in question were Hamas terrorists; they were responsible for the kidnapping and killing of three Israeli teens, Eyal Yifrah, Gilad Shaar and Naftali Frenkel; and their act of terror was condemned by the Security Council.

The United Nations will need to open a costume shop to house all the dressed-up stories penned by the Palestinian representative to conceal the truth. The truth is as follows: on the evening of 22 September, Israeli security forces undertook an operation to apprehend Marwan Kawasme and Amar Abu Aysha. As the soldiers closed in, Kawasme and Abu Aysha opened fire against them. Israel's security forces returned fire, and during the clash, the suspects were killed in the exchange.

In his slanted version of events, the Palestinian representative intentionally paints Israel in a negative light. What should be brought to light is the fact that the Palestinian Authority failed to launch an investigation to apprehend the perpetrators behind the kidnapping and killing of the three Israeli teens.

Furthermore, one has to wonder why the Palestinian representative neglects to mention Hamas's role in the attack. Hamas certainly has not been shy about taking responsibility. Saleh al-Arouri, a founder of Hamas's military wing, acknowledged his group's responsibility and described the attack as a "heroic operation by the Qassam Brigades".

The Palestinian delegate's selective description of events, as has been the case with previous letters, erodes his credibility and legitimizes terrorism. It is time for the Palestinian Authority to take constructive steps rather than whitewashing the actions of murderers.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Ron **Prosor**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

14-62145 (E) 081014

Please recycle

United Nations S/2014/722

Security Council

Distr.: General
29 September 2014

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the alternate representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 29 September 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations stating that Mr. Jonathan Dowdall has been appointed alternate representative of the United Kingdom on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, that letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

14-62153 (E) 071014

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United Nations A/69/425–S/2014/723

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
8 October 2014

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General Assembly
Sixty-ninth session
Agenda item 74
Oceans and the law of the sea

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Letter dated 6 October 2014 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to forward a copy of a letter dated 6 October 2014 by Nicos Anastasiades, President of the Republic of Cyprus, addressed to you (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 74, and of the Security Council, and have it published in the next *Law of the Sea Bulletin*.

(*Signed*) Menelaos **Menelaou**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

14-62285 (E) 101014

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Annex to the letter dated 6 October from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I felt the need to communicate in writing with you, so soon after our last meeting in New York, in order to bring to your attention some recent developments that are not compatible with the smooth continuation of the talks on the Cyprus problem. They have the potential to destroy the efforts of creating a good and positive environment and to actually derail the whole negotiating process. It is regrettable that these developments come at a time when your new Special Adviser on Cyprus is trying to set the necessary conditions and framework for the resumption of the talks and for substantial negotiations.

I refer to the latest decision by the Turkish Government to illegally interfere in the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus. More precisely, the Turkish scientific ship *Barbaros Hayreddin Pasa*, accompanied by two other support vessels, will carry out a seismic survey from 20 October to 30 December 2014 in the southern sea of Cyprus and more specifically in blocks 1, 2, 3, 8 and 9 of the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus. For that purpose, Turkey already issued a navigational telex directive, through which it designated certain areas of the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus as reserved.

It is worth noting that blocks 2, 3 and 9 have been assigned by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus to the Eni and Kogas companies for exploration and exploitation of possible hydrocarbon reserves in the seabed subsoil. Suffice it to add that Eni and Kogas have already commenced a drilling operation in block 9 in order to explore the possibility of the existence of hydrocarbon reserves, in accordance with an agreement they signed with the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.

This is the culmination of a continued provocative policy of disputing and interfering with the sovereign rights of the Republic of Cyprus in its exclusive economic zone through the exploration and exploitation of this zone's natural resources in accordance with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

It is recalled that this provocative policy included, apart from continued verbal threats and rhetoric, the harassment of vessels performing lawful activities authorized by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, by Turkish warships and military aircraft, and unlawful seismic surveys within the western exclusive economic zone of Cyprus by Turkish vessels.

However, this is the first time that Turkey decided to escalate its provocation and directly carry out a seismic survey in specific blocks, some of which have been assigned to international companies (blocks 2, 3 and 9), within the southern part of the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus.

I would like to recall that the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus was proclaimed in 2004 and that proclamation was done in accordance with international law, thus ensuring the Republic's exclusive sovereign rights and jurisdiction in relation to that area.

The foregoing Turkish intentions as well as their timing give rise to grave concerns. They point to the increasingly aggressive nature of Turkey's actions in areas in the eastern Mediterranean under the jurisdiction of the Republic of Cyprus.

Their timing, in the midst of a process aiming to reunify the island, serves only to undermine the process and to raise more doubts as to Turkey's commitment to it. In addition, these intentions contribute towards the increase of the overall tension in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.

So far, I have provided you with ample proof of my goodwill and good faith in pursuing the negotiations for the settlement of the Cyprus problem and the efforts for a negotiated solution, as soon as possible. But in order to be successful in that endeavour, all sides should be able to show the same kind of commitment and determination. Unfortunately, this does not seem to be the case with the Turkish side, as proven by the above-mentioned latest decisions and intended actions.

Negotiating under constant threat and blackmail that undermine all efforts to create the good environment necessary for a successful outcome of the negotiations for the settlement of the Cyprus problem is not just counterproductive. It also has a negative effect on public opinion, which should be able to support our effort for a settlement and needs to be convinced that confidence and trust between the sides could and should be restored. Unfortunately, these latest decisions and intentions of the Turkish Government do not contribute towards that aim: on the contrary, they run counter to it.

Therefore, given the Turkish threats and blackmail, I am obliged to suspend my participation in the meetings with Mr. Eroglu, under the aegis of Espen Eide, on 9 and 10 October, to allow time for you and other Governments, friends of your good offices mission, to convince Turkey to reconsider.

I am very well aware of your personal interest in the settlement of the Cyprus problem, for which we are grateful. I do recall that during our last meeting in New York, you expressed your willingness to approach Turkey in order to convince Ankara to substantially contribute towards the settlement of the Cyprus problem.

I would thus kindly request your intervention in an effort to convince the Turkish Government not to go ahead with the realization of the intended seismic survey described above, or any other interference and violation of the sovereign rights of Cyprus in its exclusive economic zone, as such a realization would strike a heavy blow against the negotiations for the settlement of the Cyprus problem.

Moreover, your success in convincing Turkey to refrain from carrying out its intentions will be a great contribution towards decreasing tension and creating conditions of stability in the already volatile region of the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.

(*Signed*) Nicos **Anastasiades**

United Nations S/2014/724

Security Council

Distr.: General
8 October 2014

Original: English

Identical letters dated 8 October 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I am writing to draw your attention to a violent escalation in our region. Yesterday, two Israeli soldiers were seriously injured when three improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were detonated on the Israeli side of the Blue Line. Shortly after the attack, Hizbullah claimed responsibility for planting the devices. This is not the first incident of this nature. Earlier this year, Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah admitted his organization's responsibility for planting a roadside bomb in the vicinity of Mount Dov.

These attacks constitute a flagrant breach of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006). Israel has shown considerable restraint, but cannot be expected to stand by as its citizens are continuously put at risk. Israel will not accept any attacks on its territory. The Government of Israel holds the Government of Lebanon responsible for all attacks emanating from Lebanese territory. It must disarm Hizbullah and stem the uninterrupted flow of arms from Iran and Syria into Lebanon as required by numerous Security Council resolutions.

Like other violent Islamist groups, Hizbullah is driven by radical religious views, is notorious for brutality, and poses a significant danger to international peace and security. As Prime Minister Netanyahu said in his speech to the General Assembly, the radical groups plaguing the Middle East are branches of the same poisonous tree. ISIS has spread like a weed through Syria and Iraq, Al-Qaida has branched out into North Africa and Yemen, and Hizbullah has grown deep roots in Lebanon.

Before the situation further deteriorates, I urge the Security Council and the Secretary-General to condemn this attack and demand that the Lebanese Government take responsibility by deploying the Lebanese Armed Forces in its south. Furthermore, Israel expects the Lebanese Government to arrest the perpetrators who planted the IEDs.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Ron **Prosor**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

14-62237 (E) 091014

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Letter dated 8 October 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Argentina to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that, under the presidency of Argentina, the Security Council will be holding an open debate on the theme "Working methods of the Security Council" on Thursday, 23 October 2014. In order to guide the debate, Argentina has prepared the attached concept paper (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) María Cristina Perceval
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

14-62271 (E) 101014 101014

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Annex to the letter dated 8 October 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Argentina to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]

Open debate of the Security Council on the theme "Working methods of the Security Council", 23 October 2013

Concept paper

The working methods of the Security Council are of interest not only to Council members but also to the broader membership. In addition to being interested in improving the efficiency of the Council's work, Member States are particularly keen on the development of more democratic practices, transparency and accountability, as evidenced by the fact that these issues are raised repeatedly at the annual open debates on the working methods of the Council, as well as in specific groupings and at other meetings where that question is discussed. In the note by the President of the Security Council of 28 August 2013 (S/2013/515), the members of the Council expressed their commitment to continuing to provide opportunities to hear the views of the broader membership on the working methods of the Council, including in any open debate on the implementation of the note by the President of 26 July 2010 (S/2010/507), and to welcoming the continued participation of the broader membership in such debates.

Argentina, which has chaired the Security Council Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions for two consecutive years (January 2013-December 2014), is pleased to convene this open debate to honour that commitment, as one of the highlights of its presidency of the Council for the month of October 2014.

Security Council reform, which is being debated by the General Assembly, does not constitute the subject of this open debate, which considers instead the procedures of the Council and the way the Council conducts its work.

1. Background

The working methods of the Security Council have developed greatly throughout the years, yet the demands of the international community continue to grow. Some issues are recurrent, both in internal discussions and in the statements of the broader membership, and are considered always in the quest for improvement. Other issues have also emerged, representing new areas of concern.

During the current chairmanship of the Informal Working Group, both recurring and new issues have been addressed.

In 2013, the Informal Working Group drafted two notes by the President: the one dated 28 August 2013 focused on dialogue with non-members of the Security Council and other bodies (S/2013/515) and the one dated 28 October 2013 dealt with consultations between the Council, the Secretariat and troop- and police-contributing countries (S/2013/630). In 2014, the Informal Working Group drafted two other notes by the President: the one dated 14 April 2014 was on the role of penholders in the drafting of Council products (S/2014/268) and the one dated

4 August 2014 was on intra-Council dialogue (S/2014/565). All four notes build upon prior decisions of the Council. Also in 2014, the Informal Working Group worked on a note by the President dated 4 June 2014 on a new issue: the handover of the chairmanships of subsidiary bodies (S/2014/393).

One of the proposals made by the Argentine chairmanship at the beginning of its term was to discuss extending the mandate of the Office of the Ombudsperson to cover other sanctions lists, that is to say, not only the list created pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1333 (2000) and 1989 (2011) (the Al-Qaida Sanctions List). That proposal did not enjoy consensus. Furthermore, the Council has to date failed to agree on a mechanism for following up on situations referred by it to the International Criminal Court. Neither issue is new, but the Council has yet to take up either.

2. Objectives and proposed issues for debate

For the upcoming open debate, it is proposed that delegations build on the experience of prior discussions at previous open debates on the working methods of the Security Council, wrap-up sessions and other events by assessing the progress made since the 2013 annual open debate, identifying gaps and making concrete proposals to the Informal Working Group or to the Council to enhance the efficiency, transparency and interactivity of the work of the Council. In assessing progress, it is important to consider the documents concerning the working methods of the Council agreed upon by the Informal Working Group since the 2013 open debate (S/2013/630, S/2014/268, S/2014/393 and S/2014/565) and the implementation — or lack thereof — of previously adopted notes by the President of the Council.

Delegations are invited to consider two issues that the Security Council should address in a more meaningful manner: due process and targeted sanctions, in particular the possibility of extending the mandate of the Ombudsperson to all sanctions committees; and Security Council follow-up of its referrals to the International Criminal Court.

Enhancing due process in sanctions regimes

Targeted sanctions were an important United Nations response to the controversy surrounding the adverse humanitarian impact of the comprehensive economic sanctions that prevailed in the early 1990s. The purpose of targeted sanctions is to apply restrictive measures against individuals, entities or materials that are contributing to the threat to international peace and security during or immediately after a conflict. Throughout the years, in each of the categories subject to targeted sanctions — finance, travel, arms and commodities — the Security Council has adopted a number of policy innovations to improve their design and to overcome problems resulting from inadequate implementation.

As important as the requirements for effectively implementing targeted sanctions was the demand that fair and clear procedures exist for placing individuals and entities on sanctions lists and for removing them, as well as for granting humanitarian exemptions. This concern was reflected in paragraph 109 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome document, which was adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 60/1.

In response to that demand, on 19 December 2006 the Security Council adopted resolution 1730 (2006), by which it requested the Secretary-General to establish within the Secretariat (Security Council Subsidiary Organs Branch) a focal point to receive delisting requests and to perform the tasks described in the annex to that resolution. Petitioners can submit delisting requests either through the focal point process outlined in resolution 1730 (2006) or through their State of residence or citizenship. As set out in footnote 1 of the annex to resolution 1730 (2006), a State can decide that, as a rule, its citizens or residents should address their delisting requests directly to the focal point. The State does so by a declaration addressed to the Chair of the relevant sanctions committee. To date, two States, including one permanent member of the Security Council, have submitted such declarations.

In 2009, after the matter had been considered for several years by the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization, the General Assembly took note of the annex to its resolution 64/115, entitled "Introduction and implementation of sanctions imposed by the United Nations". Paragraph 7 of that annex reads:

> Sanctions regimes with regard to individuals and entities should ensure that the decision to list such individuals and entities is based on fair and clear procedures, including, as appropriate, a detailed statement of case provided by Member States, and that regular reviews of names on the list are conducted; ensure, to the degree possible, maximum specificity in identifying individuals and entities to be targeted; and ensure also that fair and clear procedures for delisting exist early in sanctions regimes. Listed individuals and entities should be notified of the decision and of as much detail as possible in the publicly releasable portion of the statement of case. There should be an appropriate mechanism for handling individuals' or entities' requests for delisting.

The Office of the Ombudsperson was created by Security Council resolution 1904 (2009) and its mandate was extended by resolutions 1989 (2011), 2083 (2012) and 2161 (2014). Individuals, groups, undertakings or entities seeking to be removed from the Al-Qaida Sanctions List can submit a request for delisting to an independent and impartial Ombudsperson appointed by the Secretary-General. The Ombudsperson is mandated to gather information and to interact with the petitioner, relevant States and organizations with regard to the request. Within an established time frame, the Ombudsperson will then present a comprehensive report to the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities. The report will detail the information gathered, including from the petitioner, and provide an analysis and the Ombudsperson's observations. The report will also set out for the Committee the principal arguments concerning the specific delisting request and contain a recommendation from the Ombudsperson on the request. Should the Ombudsperson recommend that the Committee consider delisting, the individual or entity will be delisted unless, within 60 days, the Committee decides by consensus that the individual or entity should remain on the list. If there is no such consensus, however, during that 60-day period a Committee member may request that the matter be referred to the Council. The decision of the Committee on the delisting request, setting out reasons and including any further relevant information, will be communicated to the petitioner by the Ombudsperson.

Although due process has improved with the creation of the Office of the Ombudsperson and with each new Security Council resolution, because of both human rights and security concerns, due process issues continue to be raised by Members of the Council and by the broader membership alike. Probably the most significant concern raised by Member States is that the mandate of the Ombudsperson covers only petitioners whose names are inscribed on the Al-Qaida Sanctions List.

In the seventh and eighth reports of the Office of the Ombudsperson submitted pursuant to paragraph 18 (c) of annex II to Security Council resolution 2083 (2012) (S/2014/73 and S/2014/553), dated 31 January 2014 and 31 July 2014 respectively, a number of considerations and recommendations were made on how to continue to deliver a fair process and contribute to strengthening the effectiveness and credibility of the Al-Qaida sanctions regime of the Council. While stressing that the Ombudsperson process continues to operate in compliance with the fundamental principles of fairness, in the reports it is indicated that further advances are needed in terms of due process, in particular with regard to the manner in which reasons for removing and maintaining names on the list are made and provided, including the issue of the absence of public disclosure, and the general lack of transparency in the process. Concerns were also expressed in both reports that, while the Ombudsperson had functioned independently in practice, no separate Office of the Ombudsperson had been established as mandated. Furthermore, the administrative structure relied on to implement the resolution, in terms of budget, staff management and contractual arrangements, lacked the critical features of autonomy and contained insufficient safeguards for independence. In the reports, it was concluded that due process could and must be strengthened and, at the same time, it was shown that there was merit in having an independent and impartial Ombudsperson who, in addition to and bearing in mind her experience in dealing with individual delisting requests, made recommendations to the Council to continue to strengthen due process.

In this context, participants in the open debate are encouraged to address the question of due process in targeted sanctions, in particular the possibility of extending the mandate of the Ombudsperson to all sanctions committees, building on the experience gained by the Office of the Ombudsperson with the Al-Qaida sanctions regime.

Follow-up of Security Council referrals to the International Criminal Court

At the Security Council open debate held on 17 October 2012 on the initiative of Guatemala on the theme "Peace and justice, with a special focus on the role of the International Criminal Court", a number of Member States called for a more efficient and vigorous follow-up to cases referred by the Council to the International Criminal Court than was contained in the Court's periodic reports, as an essential part of the responsible action taken by the Council to foster justice and accountability for serious crimes of international concern. At other open debates, many Member States have reiterated their concern about a lack of effective and responsible follow-up to cases referred by the Council to the Court.

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court gives the Security Council a unique jurisdictional role. By article 13 (b) of the Statute, the Court grants the Council the power, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, to refer to the Court situations in which one or more crimes within the

jurisdiction of the Court (genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes) appear to have been committed. By article 16, on the other hand, the Council is allowed to defer an investigation or prosecution for a period of 12 months after a resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter has been adopted, for reasons relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. To date, the Council has referred two situations to the Court: the situation in Darfur (resolution 1593 (2005)) and the situation in Libya (resolution 1970 (2011)). In making the referrals, the Council decided that authorities of the countries concerned should cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor and, while recognizing that States not party to the Rome Statute had no obligation under the Statute, urged all States and regional and other international organizations concerned to cooperate fully. Pursuant to paragraph 8 of resolution 1593 (2003) and paragraph 7 of resolution 1970 (2011), the Prosecutor of the Court is invited to report to the Council every six months on the judicial activities undertaken, including on the cooperation received or not received from both States party and States not party to the Rome Statue. In addition, the Council has received seven letters from the President of the Court relating to the obligation to cooperate with the Court. The Council has never responded to any of the Court's letters or taken any other action in response to a failure to cooperate with the Court.

In the nineteenth report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the Security Council pursuant to resolution 1593 (2005), dated 23 June 2014, it was pointed out that, in a number of its decisions, Pre-Trial Chamber II had reiterated the following:

> Unlike domestic courts, the ICC has no direct enforcement mechanism in the sense that it lacks a police force. As such, the ICC relies mainly on the States' cooperation, without which it cannot fulfil its mandate. When the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, refers a situation to the Court as constituting a threat to international peace and security, it must be expected that the Council would respond by way of taking such measures which are considered appropriate, if there is an apparent failure on the part of States Parties to the Statute or Sudan to cooperate in fulfilling the Court's mandate as entrusted to them by the Council. Otherwise, if there is no follow-up action on the part of the Security Council, any referral by the Council to the ICC under Chapter VII of the UN Charter would never achieve its ultimate goal, namely, to put an end to impunity. Accordingly, any such referral would become futile (para. 25).

Both States party and States not party to the Rome Statute have expressed support for this view.

On 12 February 2013, in a presidential statement on the protection of civilians (S/PRST/2013/2), the Security Council, while noting that the fight against impunity and accountability for the most serious crimes of international concern had been strengthened through the work on and prosecution of those crimes in the International Criminal Court, in accordance with the Rome Statute, in ad hoc and "mixed" tribunals as well as specialized chambers in national tribunals, reiterated its call on the importance of State cooperation with those courts and tribunals in accordance with the States' respective obligations and expressed its commitment to an effective follow-up of Council decisions in that regard. The Council has requested the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to brief the Council

every sixth months on both referrals; but, unlike issues pertaining to the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, which have been dealt with, since 2000, by the Security Council Informal Working Group on International Tribunals, the Council has to date not conducted an effective follow-up of the referrals nor has it agreed on a follow-up mechanism.

The open debate will provide an opportunity for Member States to continue to discuss the establishment of a mechanism to demonstrate the Security Council commitment to an effective follow-up of its referrals to the Court, including by considering whether the Informal Working Group on International Tribunals should be tasked with dealing with issues pertaining to Court referrals or establishing a specific subsidiary body.

3. Format

The meeting will be held on Thursday, 23 October 2014, at 10 a.m., in an open debate format, in order to allow Member States to share their views on matters pertaining to the agenda item under consideration.

As an innovation compared to the open debates held in previous years, participants in the meeting will be briefed by the Ombudsperson of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, Kimberly Prost, and the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda.

The Ombudsperson will be invited to brief the Council on the counter-terrorism regime under her mandate and due process of law and to make recommendations for further enhancing the effectiveness of the regime.

The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court will be invited to focus her presentation on the value of strengthened cooperation between the Security Council and the Court, in particular with regard to the follow-up of referrals, in pursuance of the shared aim of combating impunity for heinous crimes.